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FEDERAL TAXATION OF NEW MEXICO
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
R. DALE SWIHART*

Although hundreds of federal taxation problems involving community property have been resolved by reported federal court cases, with only several exceptions1 the problems had their genesis in community property states other than
New Mexico. 2 As a result, an analysis of federal taxation of New Mexico com-

munity property must be based on the results reached to problems raised under
different, although similar, communtiy property structures and a translation of
those results into meaningful conclusions based on New Mexico community
property law.3 And, since courts dealing with community property are prone to
use empty phrases and terms with religious fervor, such a translation is subject
to a severe semantic handicap. The only sound basis for a determination of the
federal tax treatment of community property is found in an analysis of the attributes of ownership or control over the community property which the wife
may have ;4 for New Mexico this analysis has consisted of federal administrative
acceptance of state court dogma that the wife's interest is equal with the husband's 5 and therefore is a vested interest.8 Using terms "equal with the hus*Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico
1. See, for example, Massaglia v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1961),
affirming 33 T.C. 379 (1959) ; Floersch v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 260 (D. N.M.
1959), rev'd, 276 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1960) ; Hernandez v. Becker, 54 F.2d 542 (10th
Cir. 1931) ; Estelle B. Sargent, 22 B.T.A. 1270 (1931).
2. The other seven traditional community property states are Arizona, California,
Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, Texas and Washington. See note 367 infra. For a short
period of time several other states adopted a community property system in order to
secure tax advantages: Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon and Pennsylvania, as
well as Hawaii. See note 144 infra and accompanying text.
3. For a general analysis and an historical survey of New Mexico community property law, see Clark, Community of Property and the Family in New Mexico (1956).
4. Federal court cases granting a shifting of income from the husband to the wife in
certain community property states were decided during a period when other income
shifting devices were declared ineffectual for tax purposes. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S.
111 (1929) and Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1939). See Altman, Community
Property in Peril: Or The Lengthening Shadow of the Clifford Case, 19 Taxes 262

(1941). The federal courts have drawn a distinction based on the wife's control over
the husband's role as manager of the community. For a dissent from this analysis, see
Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44, 49-57
(1944): "The truth of the matter is that Lucas v.Earl and Helqvering v. Clifford on the
one hand and Poe v. Seaborn [the community property decision, see note 120 infra and
accompanying text] on the other state competing theories of income tax liability. Or to
put it another way, Poe v. Seabortq has been carved out as an exception to the general

rules of liability for income taxes." Id. at 56.
5. Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 185 Pac. 780 (1919).
6. T.D. 3138, 4 Cum. Bull. 238 (1921).
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band" 7 and "vested" 8 is a poor substitute for a meaningful investigation of the
wife's control over community property in New Mexico, carried out within a
tax oriented framework. 9 I contend such an investigation leads to the conclusion
that the federal tax treatment of community property in New Mexico is unsound now and has been so for the past forty-three years.
I
ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL TAXATION OF COMMUNITY INCOME

Prologue:Arnett v. Reade' °

Eight years before the adoption of the Revenue Act of 191611 the Supreme
Court of the Territory of New Mexico tackled the problem which later became
critical in determining how community property should be taxed under the
Revenue Acts: how should the nature of the wife's interest in New Mexico
community property be characterized? In Reade v. de Lea 12 the defendant's
husband, in 1902, a few weeks prior to his death, conveyed real estate to the
plaintiff, without having his wife, the defendant, join in the deed. The real
estate had been acquired in 1889 and 1893 by two conveyances which ran to
the husband. In 1901 the territorial legislature passed a statute' 8 which required the joinder of spouses in the transfer of real estate acquired by the spouses
during their marriage with community property. Prior to 1901 no such restriction was placed upon the husband's management, but, rather, he was given
a complete power of disposition over the community property during the exist7. See note 78 infra and accompanying text for an analysis of the manner in which
the New Mexico Supreme Court reached this conclusion in Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459,
185 Pac. 780 (1919).
1
8. See Part III of this article infra for a consideration of the use of the word
"vested" by the New Mexico courts in describing the nature of the wife's interest in
New Mexico community property.
9. Professor Edmond Cahn once proposed: "Once the problem is analyzed in terms
of control, the entire mistaken excursion into the metaphysics of vested and contingent
rights can be permanently abandoned." Cahn, Federal Taxation and Private Law, 44
Colum. L. Rev. 669, 678 (1944). Unfortunately, the excursion matured into a sentimental journey.
10. 220 U.S. 311 (1911). The case, of course, iscited often for one of Holmes' very
quotable observations: "It is not necessary to go very deeply into the precise nature of
the wife's interest during marriage. The discussion has fed the flame of juridical controversy for many years." Id. at 319.
11. Ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756.
12. 14 N.M. 442, 95 Pac. 131 (1908).
13. N.M. Laws 1901, ch. 62, § 6. The statutory language is as follows: "Neither
husband nor' wife shall convey, mortgage, incumber or dispose of, any real estate, or
legal or equitable interest therein acquired during coverture by onerous title [community property], unless both join in the execution thereof . ..."
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ence of the community. Indeed, prior to 1901 the only statutory description
of community property was contained in the inheritance provisions ;15 by operation of those statutory sections either spouse upon death could dispose by will of
all of his or her separate estate and one-half of the community property. 16
The plaintiff, Reade, brought action to quiet title to the real estate conveyed
to him by the defendant's husband, and the defendant based her argument on
the 1901 statutory provision requiring joinder. She argued that the conveyances
were invalid since she did not join in the deed; in response the plaintiff argued that the 1901 statute could have no effect upon the conveyance of property
acquired before its passage, since the husband was, before that time, the outright owner of the community property, and the legislature could not destroy
the vested rights of the husband by requiring the wife to join in the transfer
of property over which he was owner. 17 The trial court found for the plaintiff;
the defendant appealed; and over a strong dissent the Supreme Court of the
Territory of New Mexico affirmed the decision of the trial court. The appellate
court concluded that the "wife's interest being merely an expectancy it constituted no vested right. The wife having no vested interest and its being evident
that the proprietary right must be vested somewhere, it follows under the rule
of exclusion that such right must be found in the husband."' 8 The court held
14. Before this time the husband's powers over the community property were not
governed by statute, but rather were a carryover of the Spanish law. For a discussion of
early decisions (construing the law before the passage of the 1901 act) see Clark, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 8-12.
15. See N.M. Comp. Laws 1897, § 2030:
First. All property, both real and personal, brought into the marriage
community by the surviving husband or wife, or acquired by him or her by
inheritance, donation or legacy, shall constitute his or her separate estate, and
shall be subject to the private debts of such survivor. Second. All property,
both real and personal, acquired by either the husband or wife during the
existence of the marriage community, otherwise than as stated in the last
preceding paragraph, shall constitute the acquest [community] property, and
shall be liable for the common debts.
16. N.M. Comp. Laws 1897, §§ 2030 and 2031. Under § 2030 "one-half of the acquest
[community] property which remains after the payment of the common debts of the
marriage, shall be set apart to the surviving husband or wife absolutely." And under
§ 2031:
Subject to the rights, charges and deductions hereinbefore provided, and to
the payment of the debts of the decedent, the remainder of the acquest property
and the separate estate of the decedent shall constitute the body of the estate
for descent and distribution, and may be disposed of by will, or in the absence
of a will, shall descend as follows: One-fourth thereof to the surviving husband
or wife and the remainder in equal shares to the children of the decedent.
17. The plaintiff relied on the Spanish-Mexican law as interpreted by the California
courts in Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48 Pac. 228 (1897). The Spreckels decision
had held that the husband's power of disposition over the community property could not
be impaired by a statute enacted after the acquisition of the property. See the statement
by the counsel for the plaintiff, Reade v. de Lea, 14 N.M. 442, 446-47 (1908).
18. Reade v. de Lea, 14 N.M. 442, 463, 95 Pac. 131, 138 (1908).
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specifically that the 1901 statute did not apply to community property acquired
before the passage of the statute,"9 and that the conveyance by the husband
20
without the joinder of the wife was valid. In the dissenting opinion Judge
Abbott argued that the majority was incorrect in finding that the husband's
"owner." 21
control over the community property was so complete that he was
Judge Abbott posed the question the answer to which was to be determinative in
the appeal to the United States Supreme Court: "If up to the moment of her
it thereupon become a portion
death her husband was the owner of it, how could
22
?"
descent
of
law
the
to
of her estate subject
23
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, in Arnett v. Reade,

the decision of the supreme court of the territory was reversed. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, answered the rhetorical question posed by
Judge Abbott in the following fashion:
The Supreme Court [of the Territory of New Mexico] does not put
its decision upon that ground, but upon the notion that during the joint
lives the husband was in substance the owner, the wife having a mere
expectancy, and that the old saying was true that community is a partnership which begins only at its end. We do not perceive how this
statement of the wife's position can be reconciled with the old law of
New Mexico .

. .

. For if the wife had a mere possibility, it would

19. The court followed the path taken in Spreckles v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48 Pac.
228 (1897). Reade v. de Lea, 14 N.M. 442, 464, 95 Pac. 131, 138 (1908). At this time
California did not grant the wife a power of testamentary disposition over one-half of
the community property; it was not until 1923 that a statute granting this power was
passed by the California legislature. Cal. Laws 1923, ch. 18, § 1.
20. The court utilized a statement in an earlier New Mexico case, Newton v. Thornton, 3 N.M. 287, 5 Pac. 257 (1885): "No legislature can take or destroy private property
for private use by statutory enactments and so far as this statute attempts anything of
that kind it is clearly void." Reade v. de Lea, 14 N.M. 442, 465-66, 95 Pac. 131, 139
(1908).
21. Judge Abbott, in dissent, struck hard at the reliance placed by the majority on
the California case of Spreckels v. Spreckels. See note 19 supra.
By statute, in 1861 [in California], it was distinctly provided that upon the
dissolution of the community by the death of the wife, the entire community
property should go to the husband, and it has since been added that it 'shall go'
to him 'without administration,' 'except such portion thereof as may have been
set apart to her by judicial decree for her support and maintenance.' By those
provisions the wife's interest was indeed 'a mere expectancy' depending on her
surviving her husband, and the decision in Spreckles v. Spreckles, supra, although not in terms based on the statute, was quite in keeping with it. As
Beatty, C. J. said at the close of his opinion, concurring in the result, 'if the
husband survives the wife, he will get everything he had not voluntarily parted
with.' But no such conditions have ever obtained here, and why should we
import conclusions when the premises are lacking?
Reade v. de Lea, 14 N.M. 442, 474-75, 95 Pac. 131, 142 (1908).
22. Id. at 472, 95 Pac. at 141.
23. 220 U.S. 311 (1911).
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seem that whatever went to the husband from her so-called
half would
24
not descend from her, but merely would continue his.

Referring only to the Arnett v. Reade decision it is somewhat difficult to pinpoint the Court's description of the wife's interest in New Mexico community
property before 1907, because Mr. Justice Holmes stated only that "it is very
plain that the wife has a greater interest than the mere possibility of an expectant heir. ' 25 But it seems clear from the comments made by Mr. Justice Holmes
in a later decision that he felt the Court had made a more definitive holding
on the nature of the wife's interest in Arnett v. Reade. Fourteen years later in
United States v. RobbinsY26 Holmes observed: "That she has vested rights has
been determined by this Court with reference to some jurisdictions . . . Arnett
v. Reade .... ,,27 In light of the comments made in the two cases it seems

proper to conclude that the Supreme Court was willing to characterize the
wife's rights in the community property as "vested" if she has the power of
testamentary disposition over one-half of the community property. 28
Statutory Pattern of New Mexico Community Property Priorto the Adoption
of the Revenue Act of 191629

Prior to the adoption of the statutory provisions in 1901 upon which the
controversy in Arnett v. Reade focused, the only division between separate and
community property made by statute was in the inheritance provisions. 0 Simply
stated, those provisions grouped property owned by a spouse at the time of the
marriage or acquired by inheritance or gift after the marriage into a separate
property category 1 and classified all property acquired by any other means
during the marriage by either spouse as community property.8 2 Although this
identification of community property clearly applied to a distribution at the
death of one of the spouses, another statutory provision3" threw doubt on
whether such a division existed during the marriage. One of the sections of the
married women's property act, which was enacted in 188484 and repealed in
24. Id. at 318-19.
25. Id. at 320.
26. 269 U.S. 315 (1926).
27. Id. at 326.
28. Holmes, indeed, relied heavily on Judge Abbott's dissenting opinion and especially on the distinction drawn by Judge Abbott between the California rule which
denied the power of testamentary disposition to the wife and the New Mexico rule
which gave the wife that power. Arnett v. Reade, 220 U.S. 311, 319 (1911).
29. Ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756.
30. See note 15 supra.
31. Ibid.
32. See note 16 supra.

33. N.M. Laws 1884, ch. 14, § 1; N.M. Comp. Laws 1897, § 1509.
34. N.M. Laws 1884, ch. 14, § 1.
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1901,3 5 provided that the wife could receive any property and the "avails of
36
her industry" to hold and use "as if she were unmarried." Although this provision clearly indicated that the wife would not add any property to the community by her earnings, New Mexico courts acted after the passage of the
section as though it did not exist. Thus, the supreme court of the territory
established the rule that property acquired by the wife, as well as by37the husband, during the existence of the community was community property.
In 1901 these statutory provisions were repealed, and a more complete set
of community property rules was enacted.38 The inheritance rule which gave
the spouse the right to dispose of one-half of the community property at death
was modified;39 the method of dividing community property from separate
property was retained ;40 and the married women's property act rule discussed
above was repealed. 41 Thus, under the 1901 statute community property was
defined as property acquired during the marriage by the spouses, unless acquired
by gift, inheritance or bequest.42 Further, the wife and husband were required
35. N.M. Laws 1901, ch. 62, § 32.
36. Some conflict between the married women's property act and the community
property law of the jurisdiction was almost inevitable. Professor Clark reports that the
confusion persisted long after this statutory section was repealed. Clark, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 12-13. The provision stated:
All property, real, personal and mixed, and choses in action, owned by any
married woman, or owned or held by any woman at the time of her marriage,
shall continue to be her separate property, notwithstanding such marriage, and
any married woman may, during coverture, receive, take, hold, use and enjoy
property of any and every description, and all avails of her industry, free from
any liability of her husband on account of his debts, as fully as if she were unmarried.
N.M. Laws 1884, ch. 14, § 1; N.M. Comp. Laws 1897, § 1509.
37. Strong v. Eakin, 11 N.M. 107, 66 Pac. 539 (1901) ; Barnett v. Barnett, 9 N.M.
205, 50 Pac. 337 (1897).
38. N.M. Laws 1901, ch. 62.
39. Generally, the statutory structure was as follows:
(a) For individual purposes, such as the spouse's debts, contracts or torts, no community property existed; rather, all property acquired by a spouse either before or during marriage was that spouse's separate estate. N.M. Laws 1901, ch. 62, § 1.
(b) The kind of separate property acquired by the spouse was given a descriptive title: either acquired by lucrative title or by onerous title. Property acquired by the
spouse by lucrative title was (1) property acquired prior to marriage and (2) property
acquired during marriage by gift, inheritance or devise (unless untraceable). All other
property acquired by the spouse was by onerous title. N.M. Laws 1901, ch. 62, § 2.
(c) On death the decedent spouse could dispose by will of only one-half of his or
her separate estate acquired by onerous title. In other words, there was no right to dispose of one-half of the "community" property, but, rather, a right to dispose of onehalf of the "community" property which had been acquired by the decedent spouse.
N.M. Laws 1901, ch. 62, § 7.
40. N.M. Laws 1901, ch. 62, § 7.
41. N.M. Laws 1901, ch. 62, § 32.
42. N.M. Laws 1901, ch. 62, § 2.
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to join in a transfer of community real estate; 43 either spouse was given the
right to sue for a division of property if the spouses were permanently separated ;44 and upon a division of property for any reason each spouse was en45
titled to one-half of the community property.
The 1901 statutory rules were in effect for only six years; in 1907 the legislature enacted another new slate of community property rules, 46 and with only
several exceptions the 1907 rules remain as the community property structure
in New Mexico today. 47 Chief among the new rules were two provisions imported verbatim from the California statutes. The first established the husband
as the manager of the community property, 48 and the second divested the wife
of the power to dispose of the community property at death if she is survived
by her husband. 49 The husband's management and control of the community
property was severely limited by the proviso that he could not make a gift of
*community property (real or personal) or convey it without a valuable consideration unless the wife consented. 50 The 1907 act retained the 1901 rule allowing a division of community property upon permanent separation,," but the
specific provision for a division of one-half of the community property to each
spouse was repealed. 52 In 1915 the limitation upon the husband's right to dispose of the commmunity property was deleted, and the 1901 rule requiring
joinder of the wife in the transfer or mortgage of real estate was reinstated. 53
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

N.M. Laws 1901, ch. 62, § 6. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
N.M. Laws 1901, ch. 62, § 23.
N.M. Laws 1901, ch. 62, § 30.
N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37.
See Part III of this article infra, where present New Mexico community property

law is discussed.
48. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 16. The provision was drawn from § 172 of the California Civil Code. See Cal. Civ. Code, § 172 (Kerr 1909). Section 16 of the New Mexico act provided: "The husband has the management and control of the community property, with the like absolute power of disposition, other than testamentary, as he has of
his separate estate; Provided, howev~er, That he cannot make a gift of such community
property, or convey the same without a valuable consideration, unless the wife, in writing, consent thereto . . . " The section added a further proviso relating to the homestead, furnishings of the home, and the wearing apparel of the wife and children.
49. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 26. This provision was adopted verbatim from § 1401
of the California Civil Code. See Cal. Civ. Code, § 1401 (Kerr 1909). It provided:
Upon the death of the wife, the entire community property, without administration, belongs to the surviving husband, except such portion thereof as may
have been set apart to her by a judicial decree, for her support and maintenance, which portion is subject to her testamentary disposition, and in the absence of such disposition, goes to her descendants, or heirs, exclusive of her
husband.
50. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 16. See the proviso in the quotation of the provision
in note 48 supra.
51. This was done by leaving N.M. Laws 1901, ch. 62, § 23 in force.
52. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 34.
53. N.M. Laws 1915, ch. 84, § 1.
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Since the New Mexico community property rules were changed completely
from the setting in which A4rnett v. Reade5 4 was decided, that case's usefulness
in describing the nature of the wife's interest in community property is limited
to a negative inference. If the wife's ability to will away one-half of the community property was sufficient to give the wife "vested rights" in the community property, 55 the lack of that power would indicate difficulty in describing
the interest as "vested." A reasonable rephrasing of Judge Abbott's question
in the dissent in Reade v. de Lea5" would be: If up to the moment of her death
both husband and wife were owners of the property in community, how could
it thereupon belong to the husband?
Administrative Determination:1916-1925
In 1919 the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued its first directive concerning
the division of community income for income tax purposes.5 7 The directive
stated:
A husband and wife can not divide the salary of the husband for the
purposes of reporting such salary in separate returns for income-tax
purposes. Income received by the husband, such as rents and interest
from property owned by him prior to his marriage, must be reported
by the husband after marriage, even though the wife is given a onehalf interest therein by the community property law of the State.5 8
Inroads upon this sweeping refusal to allow the splitting of community income
were made almost immediately. A year after the above ruling was issued the
Bureau modified it by allowing the split of income derived from property
acquired by spouses in Texas and Washington after their marriage. 59 This later
ruling, however, again stated the refusal of the Bureau to allow a split of
community income derived from wages or from property acquired before the
marriage of the spouses. The problems presented by these rulings in regard to
Texas spouses were submitted to the Attorney General for an opinion;60 in
ruling on these questions the Attorney General reversed the Bureau and found
that in Texas the husband and wife could divide their total earnings and also
divide community income from separate property and community property. 61
The administrative determination allowing division of community income in
54. 220 U.S. 311 (1911). See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
55. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
56. 14 N.M. 442, 472, 95 Pac. 131, 141 (1908). See note 22 supra and accompanying
text.
57. O.D. 285, 1 Cum. Bull. 189 (1919).
58. Ibid.
59. O.D. 426, 2 Cum. Bull. 198 (1920).
60. 32 Ops. Att'y Gen. 298 (1920).
61. The Attorney General's opinion was incorporated into T.D. 3071, 3 Cum. Bull.
221 (1920).
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Texas was extended to other community property states the following year.
The Attorney General based his conclusion that a split of community income
should be allowed in New Mexico because of Beals v. Ares,63 in which the New
Mexico Supreme Court said that the interests of husband and wife in New
Mexico community property were equal. In a state by state survey the Attorney General concluded that in New Mexico and all other community property
states, except California, the wife had during the existence 64of the marriage
relation a vested interest in one-half of the community income.

62. 32 Ops. Att'y Gen. 435 (1921), incorporated into T.D. 3138, 4 Cum. Bull. 238
(1921).
63. 25 N.M. 459, 185 Pac. 780 (1919).
64. Although pertinent statutory provisions were quoted in the opinion, the Attorney
General found a state supreme court decision in each of the seven community property
states which characterized the interest of the wife in the community property. The opinion, in essence, merely adopted that characterization as controlling:
Arizona: La Tourette v. La Tourette, 15 Ariz. 200, 205, 137 Pac. 426, 428 (1914):
The law makes no distinction between the husband and wife in respect to the
right each has in the community property. It gives the husband no higher or
better title than it gives the wife.
Idaho: Kohny v. Dunbar, 21 Idaho 258, 268, 121 Pac. 544, 548 (1912):
Since the interests of both husband and wife are the same and equal in and to
the community property, and each takes one-half upon the death of the other...
it is clear to us that if the wife must pay an inheritance tax on her half of the
property upon the death of the husband, the husband would likewise be obliged
to pay an inheritance tax on his half of the property on the death of the wife.
The law clearly places them both on an equality in this respect.
Louisiana: Succession of Marsal, 118 La. 212, 216, 42 So. 778, 779 (1907)
It is true that the right of usufruct which is vested in the surviving spouse is
defeasible at the will of the deceased, but it is, nevertheless, a right conferred by
the law, which enters into and forms part of the marriage contract, and, of which
the survivor can be deprived by no one save the deceased spouse; and it seems
to us hardly correct to say that the surviving spouse necessarily takes the usufruct by inheritance from the deceased, because the latter has not made a testamentary disposition to the contrary.
The Attorney General utilized this quotation from the Marsal case to show that although
prior to this time the courts in Louisiana characterized the wife's interest as that of an
expectant heir, in Marsal the court found that "the wife did not take either her one-half
of the community property nor the usufruct of her husband's one-half as heir . . . and
that she was not therefore compelled to pay an inheritance tax on either under the inheritance tax law of Louisiana .. . " T.D. 3138, 4 Cum. Bull. 238, 243 (1921).
Nevada: In re Williams' Estate, 40 Nev. 241, 161 Pac. 741, 747 (1916):
It may, we think, be asserted, supported by the great weight of authority, that
the interest of the wife in the community property and her title thereto is no less
than that held by the husband, and this interest and title in the wife is not to be
regarded as a mere expectancy.
Concluding, as we do, that the wife's interest in the community property goes
to her, not by succession or inheritance, but rather by a right vested in her at all
times during marriage, it follows that it is not subject to the law of inheritance
tax.
New Mexico: Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 185 Pac. 780 (1919). See notes 65-84 infra
and accompanying text.
Washington: Marston v. Rue, 92 Wash. 129, 159 Pac. 111 (1916) : The court found in

MAY, 1963]

TAXATION

OF COMMUNITY

PROPERTY

113

In Beals v. Ares,' 5 the plaintiff was the former wife of the defendant; a
year and one-half before the action was brought the defendant was granted a
divorce from his wife on the grounds of adultery. Prior to the divorce action
the defendant had his attorney and his banker confront the plaintiff with the
information that he was going to sue for divorce on the grounds of adultery
and with instructions to have her make a property settlement agreement.66 As
a result of this confrontation the plaintiff, without legal advice and in most
contrite spirit,6 7 signed the contract, deeds, and bills of sale presented by her
husband's attorney in return for an amount worth only a small fraction of
the total value of the community property. She brought action in Beals v. Ares
to set aside the deeds and contracts on the ground that she had a one-half
interest in the community property she had transferred to her former husband,
and that she was induced to sign the documents by fraud, duress and
68
intimidation.
The defendant raised two defenses to the charge of fraud presumed from
the inadequacy of consideration given by the husband to the wife for the community property. First, the defendant contended that the wife forfeited her
interest in the community property by committing adultery ;69 and, secondly,
that at the time the agreement was made neither the husband nor wife had
an absolute right in any particular portion of the community property and
that inadequacy of consideration cannot be an issue where there is no fixed
value for which the consideration is given.70 The lower court held -for the
defendant and the plaintiff appealed. With fancy sidestepping the New Mexico
the Marston case that the wife's rights in the community property were a present estate.
California: Spreckles v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48 Pac. 228 (1897). See note 21
Supra.

65. 25 N.M. 459, 185 Pac. 780 (1919).
66. "[T]he three retired into the private office of the attorney, and said attorney told
the appellant in substance that her husband had discovered that she had been untrue to
him and was going to sue for divorce upon the ground of adultery and for a division of
the property, and that he would settle the property interest with her and pay her $4,000."
25 N.M. 459, 471, 185 Pac. 780, 782 (1919). The community property held by the spouses
was worth between $100,000 and $200,000.
67. "The wife stated that it was just as she expected and that if it suited Paul it
suited her . . . ." Ibid.

68. There were four bases for the allegation of fraud: (a) she was intimidated by
the agents of the husband; (b) she had no independent legal advice; (c) she did not
know the extent and value of the property; and (d) the consideration paid by the husband was grossly inadequate.
69. The civil law rule caused the wife to forfeit her interest in the community property by the commission of adultery. It has been alleged that the court in Beals V. Ares was
mainly interested in refusing to apply this rule. See Clark, Community of Property
and the Family in New Mexico 7 (1956).
70. The rule under the 1901 statute which required an equal split of the community
property upon division had been repealed in 1907. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 34. See note
52 supra and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court reasoned that earlier New Mexico cases were inapplicable and
decided that the civil law rule which caused the wife to forfeit her share of
community property upon the commission of adultery was not in force, but
71
rather the common law, under which no such rule existed, was operative.
With that problem neatly settled the court faced the further task of finding that the New Mexico community property law, although basically drawn
from the California statutes 72 and despite the settled California rule that the
wife's interest was not equal with the husband's, 73 directed that the wife's
interest "is equal with that of the husband." 74 It follows that if the wife's interest
is on a par with the husband's the defendant's argument that inadequate consideration cannot be given for something with no fixed value must be specious.
If the wife has an equal interest with the husband she has been given consideration for precisely one-half of a value which is determinable, and thus the value
of the one-half is likewise determinable. The court admitted that the two statutory provisions relating to the husband's management and control and the distribution of community property upon the death of the wife which were drawn
from the California statutes might cause the court to reach the construction
given by the California courts. 75 But the court could turn to two sections
enacted in 1901 in support of its ultimate conclusion that the wife's interest is
equal to the husband's. The first section allowed the spouse to bring suit for a
division of property if the spouses were permanently separated, 76 and the second provided that the failure to divide property on divorce would not bar a
subsequent suit for division and distribution. 77 The court found these two provisions showed "an existing, present interest in the wife";78 but further, it was
necessary to argue away the repeal of the 1901 provision which gave the husband and wife a one-half share of the community property upon such a division. 79 This step was taken by stating that it was "wholly immaterial" why the
repeal was made by the legislature, since the two unrepealed sections "clearly
recognize a present interest in the wife, and the whole act shows that she was
an equal partner with her husband in the matrimonial gains. [!]"80
71. See note 69 supra.
72. See notes 48 and 49 supra and accompanying text.
73. See note 21 supra.
74. This, of course, was the ultimate conclusion of the court. See note 84 infra and
accompanying text,
75. Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 492, 185 Pac. 780, 790 (1919).
76. N.M. Laws 1901, ch. 62, § 23. See notes 44 and 51 supra and accompanying text.
77. N.M. Laws 1901, ch. 62, § 31. This section which was left in force by the 1907
legislature provided: "The failure to divide the property on divorce shall not affect the
property rights of either the husband or wife, either may subsequently institute and prosecute a suit for division and distribution thereof, or with reference to any other matter
pertaining thereto, which could have been litigated in the original suit for divorce."
78. Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 492, 185 Pac. 780, 790 (1919).
79. See notes 45 and 52 supra and accompanying text.
80. Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 493, 185 Pac. 780, 790 (1919).
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It should be noted that the provision allowing the spouses to sue for a division of the community property after divorce would have been a non-sequitur in
the California statutes, since the statutes required that an equal split s ' be
made of the community property upon the granting of a divorce, 8 2 except in
the case of adultery or extreme cruelty when the court could use its discretion
in making the division .8s 3 Thus, the single differentiating feature which the
New Mexico Supreme Court found in Beals v. Ares between the California
statutes and the New Mexico statutes was the right of the husband or wife to
sue for a division of the community property when permanently separated.
And on this basis the court found:
That under the law in this jurisdiction, the wife's interest in the community property is equal with that of the husband; that while he is
by statute made the agent of the community and given dominion and
control over the community property during the continuance of the
marriage relation, his interest in the property by reason of such fact
84
is not superior to that of his wife.
Finally, an ironic twist should be noted. Before the Bureau of Internal
Revenue published its ruling that spouses in New Mexico could divide the community income and spouses in California could not,8 5 California adopted the
provision relied on in Beals v. Ares and allowed the wife to bring action for
support and maintenance and for a division of the community property without
bringing an action for divorce. 8 6 New Mexico on the other hand after the commencement of the action in Beals v. Ares reduced the rights of the wife by
enacting a statute allowing the husband complete power of disposition over
81. See Cal. Civ. Code, § 146 (Kerr 1909): "If the decree be rendered on any other
ground than that of adultery or extreme cruelty, the community property shall be equally
divided between the parties."
82. See Cal. Civ. Code, § 147 (Kerr 1909): "The court, in rendering a decree of divorce, must make such order for the disposition of the community property .... "
83. "If the decree be rendered on the ground of adultery, or extreme cruelty, the community property shall be assigned to the respective parties in such proportions as the
court, from the facts of the case, and the condition of the parties, may deem just." Cal.
Civ. Code, § 146 (Kerr 1909).
84. Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 499, 185 Pac. 780, 793 (1919).
85. T.D. 3138,4 Cum. Bull. 238 (1921).
86. Cal. Laws 1917, ch. 36. The action could be brought by the wife on any of the following grounds: (a) when the husband wilfully deserts her; (b) when the husband
wilfully fails to provide for her; and (c) when the wife has any cause of action for
divorce. The statute further provided: "The court, in granting the wife permanent support and maintenance of herself, or of herself and children, in any such action, shall make
the same disposition of the community property and of the homestead, if any, as would
have been made if the marriage had been dissolved by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction."
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community personal property without receiving the wife's consent. 8 7 Thus at
the time the Attorney General wrote his opinion, the wife's rights in New
Mexico over the community property were less substantial than the wife's
rights in California. Nevertheless, since the California court referred to the
wife's interest as an "expectancy" and the court in New Mexico referred to
the wife's interest as "equal with the husband," the Attorney General granted
tax concessions to New Mexico spouses which were denied California spouses
and failed completely to recognize that in terms of control California wives
had greater powers over the community property.
The United States Supreme Court Acts: The Robbins Case"s
Since the Treasury Department had granted the privilege of splitting cominunity income between spouses in all states except California, it is not surprising
that the first Supreme Court case involving the taxation of community property
would involve California community property law. In 1918 a California couple
attempted to file separate returns, with each spouse listing one-half of the
community income in the returns for 1918. At the time these returns were
filed the Treasury Department, by regulation issued in 1919,9 refused to allow
the splitting of community income in any of the community property states. By
the time the case was taken to court, however, the Treasury Department had
90
by regulation allowed such splitting in all the other community property states.
The facts were stipulated, 91 and the issue was clear: Should community income
be taxed to the husband alone or should it be taxable one-half to each spouse?
In the district court 9 2 an exhaustive opinion was submitted comparing the
rights of the wife over community property with the rights of wives in other
community property states. The district judge noted that parallel provisions
governing the rights of the wife were found in the statutes of the other com87. N.M. Laws 1915, ch. 84, § 1. The 1915 legislature amended the rule governing
the husband's power of management and control from that quoted in note 48 supra to the
following: "The husband has the management and control of the personal property of
the community, and during coverture the husband shall have the sole power of disposition
of the personal property of the community, other than testamentary, as he has of his
separate estate; but the husband and wife must join in all deeds and mortgages affecting
real estate ....

" Furthermore, in 1917, California adopted the rule that the wife must

join the husband in any instrument, leasing, conveying or encumbering real property.
Cal. Laws 1917, ch. 583, § 2. Howev.er, the California legislature retained the provision
which forbade the husband's disposition of personal property without receiving valuable

consideration. Cal. Laws 1917, ch. 583, § 1.
88. United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315 (1926).
89. O.D. 285, 1 Cum. Bull. 189 (1919). See the quotation of the ruling in the text at
note 58 supra.
90. T.D. 3138,4 Cum. Bull. 238 (1921).
91. United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315, 326 (1926).
92. Robbins v. United States, 5 F.2d 690 (N.D. Cal. 1925).
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munity property states 93 and concluded that on this basis a different rule for
California was unjustified. 4 The lower court found that the language of the
California decisions was not controlling in a federal tax matter 9 5 and held,
therefore, that the husband and wife could split the community income in
reporting the federal income tax. 6
The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice
Holmes, reversed the lower court judgment. 97 Holmes refused to analyze
the case from the point of view adopted by the district judge: "We can see no
sufficient reason to doubt that the settled opinion of the Supreme Court of
California, at least with reference to the time before the later statutes, is that
the wife had a mere expectancy while living with her husband. '9 9 He contrasted this conclusion with the decision in Irnett v. Reade,99 which he suggested found that the wife had "vested rights."1°° The only critical difference
93. He pointed out specifically that upon the death of the wife in New Mexico and
Nevada the same rule applied as in California: namely, that the whole community property, without administration, belongs to the husband. Id. at 699.
94. The district court supplied cases to support the plaintiff's argument that "in all
essential particulars those decisions [California] do confirm to the wife all the interest
and estate necessary to a solution of the problem here, and all or more than she has
according to the decisions of the courts of last resort of other states." Id. at 700.
95.
As to the first proposition [that it is impossible to find a settled rule of property in the California decisions], it seems to me that the inconsistency is more
apparent than real. It is based upon words used, names given to things, rather
than upon the real and substantial dispositions of those things. But if it be true
that the language of the Supreme Court first used in Van Maren v. Johnson, 15
Cal. 308 that 'the interest of the wife is a mere expectancy, like the interest
which an heir may possess in the property of his ancestor,' was intended as a
real and substantial definition of her interest, and not a mere form of words,
then there is a radical inconsistency, because that court has time and again
granted and confirmed to her rights utterly and absolutely different from those
of a mere heir at law.
Ibid.
96. The district judge concluded by observing that the wife's earnings are added to
the husband's when he is required to return the entire community income.
It seems to me that the whole income can be taxed to the husband only if it is that
husband's income, to apply the distinction, as the Supreme Court said in Eisner
v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 206 .. . 'according to truth and substance, without regard
to form.' And the truth and substance is that only one-half of the income really
belongs to the husband; the other half, in law and right and justice to the wife.
Id. at 705.
97. United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315 (1926).
98. Id. at 326-27.
99. 220 U.S. 311 (1911). See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
100. His precise language was as follows:
Elaborate argument was devoted to the question whether the interest of a
wife in community property has the relatively substantial character in California that it has in some other States. That she has vested rights has been determined by this Court with reference to some jurisdictions, Warburton v. White,
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between the California statutes which were before him in Robbins and the New
Mexico statutes which were before him in Arnett v. Reade was the power of

the wife under the old New Mexico statutes to dispose of one-half of community property at death 01 while under the applicable California law she
102
could not.
After accepting the dogma of the California Supreme Court that the wife
had only an expectancy, Holmes added a last paragraph to his opinion which
laid the groundwork for the test cases discussed in the next section of this article. 1'0 In support of the Treasury's position he concluded that under the 1919
Revenue Act the husband in a community property state could be held liable
for the payment of taxes on the entire community income. Seemingly, Holmes
was making a general statement which indicated that the power of management
and control over the community property during the existence of the marriage, in itself, would be sufficient to cause the husband to be the target of
the taxing statutes. After the decision in Robbins was published, the question
was raised immediately whether the Court had held in dictum that the husband
should return the community income in his separate return in all the com10 4
munity property states.
176 U.S. 484 [Washington]; Arnett v. Reade, 220 U.S. 311; and the Treasury
Department has carried those rights to the point of allowing a division in the
return of community income in other States where the community system prevails.... Its adoption of a different rule for California was based, we presume,
upon the notion that in that State a wife had a mere expectancy while the husband was alive.
269 U.S. at 326.
101. N.M. Comp. Laws 1897, § 2030. See note 16 supra.
102. See note 49 supra.
103. In that paragraph Holmes said:
But the question before us is with regard to the power and intent of the Revenue Act of February 24, 1919 .... Even if we are wrong as to the law of California and assume that the wife had an interest in the community income that
Congress could tax if so minded, it does not follow that Congress could not tax
the husband for the whole. Although restricted in the matter of gifts, etc., he
alone has the disposition of the fund. He may spend it substantially as he chooses,
and if he wastes it in debauchery the wife has no redress ....
That he may be
taxed for such a fund seems to us to need no argument. The same and further
considerations lead to the conclusion that it was intended to tax him for the
whole. For not only should he who has all the power bear the burden, and not
only is the husband the most obvious target for the shaft, but the fund taxed,
while liable to be taken for his debts is not liable to be taken for the wife's, Civil
Code, § 167, so that the remedy for her failure to pay might be hard to find. The
reasons for holding him are at least as strong as those for holding trustees in
the cases where they are liable under the law.
269 U.S. at 327-28.
104. See Maggs, Community Property and the Federal Income Tax pts. I and II, 14
Calif. L. Rev. 351, 441 (1926) ; Note, 14 Geo. L.J. 304 (1926) ; Note, 4 Texas L. Rev. 371
(1926).
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The Test Cases10 5
Government attorneys immediately argued that the last paragraph of Mr.
Justice Holmes decision in Robbins10 6 indicated an intention on the part of
the Court to cause community income to be returned by the husband alone
since he has management and control of the income.' 0 7 One month following
the issuance of the decision in Robbins the Secretary of the Treasury requested
a ruling from the Attorney General of the United States1 0 8 regarding the effect
of Robbins on the administrative practice of allowing a split of community
income in other community property states. To aid in the determination of
that question the Attorney General gave notice that he would hold a hearing
at which representatives of taxpayers in the community property states could
give testimony and file briefs.' 0 9 After a year's consideration of the problem
the Attorney General issued an opinion directed to the Secretary of the Treasury which withdrew the two earlier opinions" which had found that married
taxpayers in all community property states, except California, could split community income for income tax purposes. The crux of the opinion withdrawing
the earlier opinions was that the question proposed could be resolved only by
analyzing the nature of the wife's interest in each of the community property
states-"' and that the decision in Robbins was not necessarily dispositive of the
question in other community property states where different rules dictated the
nature of the wife's interest. 112 Notwithstanding this conclusion, the Attorney
105. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) ; Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118 (1930)
Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930) ; and Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1930).
106. See note 103 supra.
107. See Donworth, Federal Taxation of Community Incomes-The Recent History
of Pending Questions, 4 Wash. L. Rev. 145, 159 (1929).
108. See 35 Ops. Att'y Gen. 265 (1927).
109. See Donworth, supra note 107, at 164. Mr. Donworth later argued the Washington taxpayer's case before the Supreme Court in Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101
(1930), and he was intimately connected with the test case throughout its various stages.
110. 32 Ops. Att'y Gen. 298" (1920), incorporated into T.D. 3071, 3 Cum. Bull. 221
(1920)

and 32 Ops. Att'y Gen. 435 (1921), incorporated into T.D. 3138, 4 Cum. Bull. 238

(1921). See notes 61 and 62 supra and accompanying text.
111. The following is the critical language of the opinion in that regard:
In determining the nature of an interest in community income created by
State law, it is necessary for the Federal courts to accept the decisions of the
State courts construing the statutes creating the interest and to determine from
the statutes and the decisions of the State courts the intrinsic nature of that interest. While the adjectives used by State courts in an effort to describe the
nature of the wife's interest in community income are not necessarily controlling
on the Federal courts as to the extent of the wife's interest, decisions of the State
courts holding what rights of a proprietary nature the wife may exercise in respect of community income are binding on the Federal courts.
35 Ops. Att'y Gen. 265, 266-67 (1927).
112.
The decision in the case of United States v. Robbins, supra, dealing with
the California system, does not necessarily dispose of the problem in the other
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General withdrew the earlier opinions in order to make way for possible test
cases to be pursued by the Treasury Department in the other community
113
property states.
After the receipt of the Attorney General's opinion the general counsel of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue contacted those who had submitted briefs to
the Attorney General. 1 14 As a result of correspondence and conferences the
test cases from Texas, 15 Washington,'" Louisiana 1 17 and Arizona 18 were
instituted. In the district courts each of the test cases was decided in favor of the
taxpayer by upholding the splitting of community income between spouses.
In the Circuit Court of Appeals which acted on the matter" 9 the judgments
of the district courts were affirmed. When the cases were heard by the Supreme Court, therefore, the problem for each was the same: Under the law
of this state is the wife's interest in the community income sufficient to allow
one-half to be reported by her for federal income tax purposes?
The Supreme Court examined carefully the statutes and court decisions
which controlled the rights of the spouses over community property in each of
the test-case states. 120 In general the Court found that the fact of the husband's
broad powers of management and control because he is the manager of the
community does not, in itself, negate the wife's real interest in the community
property if such a real interest can be found. 1 2 1 Several powers which were
held by the wives in the four test states were found by the Court to be sufficient
States in which some forms of the community property system are in effect. In
that case the ultimate inquiry was as to the extent to which, under the statutes
and decisions of California, the wife could exercise rights of ownership over a
share of the community income. The same problem arises in each of the other
States above mentioned. There are very substantial differences between the socalled community property systems in these various States. No two of them are
just alike. Some resemble very closely the system in California dealt with in the
Robbins case, but in other States the systems differ very considerably from the
California system.
Id. at 267.
113. This was suggested explicitly by the Attorney General. Id. at 269.
114. Donworth, supra note 107, at 166.
115. Bacon v. Hopkins, 27 F.2d 140 (N.D. Tex. 1928).
116. Seaborn v. Poe, 32 F.2d 916 (W.D. Wash. 1929).
117. Pfaff v. Bender, 38 F.2d 642 (E.D. La. 1929).
118. Koch v. Goodell (no reported opinion). See 15 Am. Fed. Tax R. 589 (1930), for
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' certification of questions to the United States Supreme
Court.
119. Hopkins v. Bacon, 38 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1930), and Bender v. Pfaff, 38 F.2d 649
(5th Cir. 1930).
120. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) ; Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118 (1930)
Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930) ; and Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1930).
121. "The community must act through an agent. . . . The law's investiture of the
husband with broad powers, by no means negatives the wife's present interest as a coowner." Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 112-13 (1930). This conclusion was criticized
severely in Bruton, The Taxation of Family Income, 41 Yale L.J. 1172 (1932).
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to give the wives a one-half interest in the community property. First in the
Court's list was the power of the wife to dispose of one-half of the community
property by testamentary disposition at her death. 1 22 In addition the Court
listed the wife's power to protect herself if the husband treated the community
property in fraud of her rights. 123 Finally, the Court mentioned several powers

which the wife possessed to prevent the husband's undue invasion of the community property. 124 The only specific point which appears in each of the cases,

however, is the equality of right of testamentary disposition between the
spouses. 125 Certainly this is the only objective criterion which would distinguish
the Robbins case from the test cases.' 26 Notwithstanding the use of these criteria
to determine the relative control of the spouses over the community property,

the Court in the Seaborn case uses the empty terminology in concluding its discussion of the problem: "Without further extending this opinion it must suffice
to say that it is clear the wife has, in Washington, a vested property right in
the community property, equal with that of her husband .... ,,127 Whether
the Court used these phrases as a shorthand method of summarizing the facets
122. In each of the test cases important emphasis was placed by the Court upon what
the wife could do with the community property upon her death, should she predecease
her husband:
"On the death of either spouse his or her interest is subject to testamentary disposition, and failing that, it passes to the issue of the decedent and not to the surviving
spouse." Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 110 (1930).
"As in Washington, each spouse has unlimited testamentary power over his or her
interest in the community, and upon failure to exercise it, such interest passes to the
descendants of the decedent." Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118, 121 (1930).
"They [Texas statutes] provide that each spouse shall have testamentary power over
his or her respective interest in the community property. In the event of failure to exercise such testamentary power they provide that the property shall go in the first instance
to the descendants of the deceased spouse." Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122, 126 (1930).
"As in the case of other states, whose law we have discussed in connection with this
matter in the Poe, Goodell and Hopkins cases, supra, each spouse may by will dispose of
only his or her one-half of the community and is powerless to affect the other's half.
In case of death intestate one-half descends to the heirs of the decedent, and the other
spouse is powerless to prevent this." Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127, 131 (1930).
123. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 111 (1930) ; Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118, 121
(1930) ; Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122, 126 (1930) ; Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127, 132
(1930).
124. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 110-11 (1930), and Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127,
132 (1930).
125. See note 122 supra. Indeed, this is the only point dealt with to any extent in the
cases other than Poe v. Seaborn.
126. And the Court was distinguishing Robbins, not overruling it. For example, note
this following language from Hopkins v. Bacon: "In view of our decision in Poe v. Seaborn, supra, the only matter to be examined here is whether under the community property system of Texas the wife has a mere expectancy, as she would under the law of
California (cf. United States ,.Robbins, 269 U.S. 315), or on the contrary has a proprietary vested interest in the community property such as makes her an owner of onehalf of the community income." Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122, 125-26 (1930).
127. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 111 (1930).
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of control the wife has over the community property in Washington or whether
the Court felt it was adding something to what it had already explained is
difficult to determine; it seems, however, that the former explanation is more
likely because of the introductory clause of the sentence.
In January of the year following the decisions in the test cases the Court
was called upon to analyze their holdings in relation to the California community property system. 28s The Court received two submitted questions from
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: 1) Must the entire community income
of a husband and wife domiciled in California be returned and the tax thereon
paid by the husband? and 2) Has the wife under § 161 (a) of the Civil Code
of California such an interest in the community income that she should separately report and pay the tax on one-half of such income?1 2 The laconic
answers to the questions were "no" to the first and "yes" to the second. 130 The
Solicitor General had conceded that
with respect to the particular income here in question, the interests
of the husband and wife were such as to bring the case within the rulings which are cited [in the test cases]-this because of amendments
of the California statutes made since United States v. Robbins, 269
3
U.S. 315 was decided.' '
The amendments in the California statutes made since 1918, which was the
date of the returns filed in Robbins, referred to by the Solicitor General were
the following: In 1923 the legislature enacted the rule allowing the wife the
power of testamentary disposition over one-half of the community property; 132
and in 1927 the legislature enacted the following:
The respective interests of the husband and wife in community property during continuance of the marriage relation are present, existing
and equal interests under the management and control of the husband
as is provided in sections 172 and 172a of the Civil Code. This secinterests and rights
tion shall be construed as defining the respective
38
of husband and wife in community property.
128. United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 (1931).
129. Id. at 793-94.
130. And this was the text of the per curiam opinion. In addition the Court added a
reference to three of the four test cases.
131. United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792, 794 (1931).
132. Cal. Laws 1923, ch. 18, § 1. The statute reads: "Upon the death of either husband
or wife, one-half of the community property belongs to the survviing spouse; the other
half is subject to the testamentary disposition of the decedent, and in the absence thereof
goes to the surviving spouse...."
133. Cal. Laws 1927, ch. 265, § 1.

MAY, 1963]

TAXATION

OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY

123

Since the entire income returned by the husband and wife in United States v.
Malcolm was salary paid to the husband for personal services, no problem
about income from community property acquired prior to a certain date was
involved.1 3 4 In the Robbins case a portion of the income returned was salary
paid to Mr. Robbins for personal services, 8 5 so on this particular issue it
was clear that in 1918, in California, income from the husband's personal
services was not returnable one-half by each spouse. No significant substantive changes were made by the California legislature in 1927; l 86 the single
meaningful change made in the California statutes since the year in issue
in the Robbins case was the 1923 amendment giving the wife the power of
testamentary disposition over one-half of the community property. Although
some commentators suggested that the 1927 declaration by the legislature
was sufficient,' 3 7 it appears likely that the reference by the Solicitor General
to "changes" made since Robbins would include both the 1923 and the
1927 enactments. 138 Indeed, a later Supreme Court case 139 indicated that
the 1927 statute might not have been necessary to the result in Malcolm:
"The final action of the legislature could well be taken as declaratory of
what it [prior legislation and litigation] involved and implied as respects
the interests of husbands and wives.' 40 Regardless of these various constructions it would seem that without the statutory change granting the wife
the power of testamentary disposition over one-half of the community property the Malcolm case would have run a different course. In the five state
community property systems which were litigated before the Supreme Court
none corresponded to the New Mexico pattern: that is, notie denied the
wife the right to dispose of one-half of the community property upon her death
134. United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792, 793 (1931).
135. United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315, 326 (1926).
136. There were two minor changes made in Cal. Laws 1927, ch. 487 and ch. 488.
137. See Cahn, Federal Taxation and PrivateLaw, 4-4
Colum. L. Rev. 669, 676 (1944),
where Professor Cahn observes:
Since no concomitant change appeared in the pragmatic rights and remedies
of the wife or of her creditors, observers of little faith may have doubted this
pronouncement's efficacy ....
When, subsequently, the California income tax case appeared again in the
Supreme Court, the state legislature was fully vindicated. The magic of its formula proved so potent that the Government freely conceded a fundamental
change in the wife's status. The Supreme Court gave its per curiam opinion in
favor of the California taxpayer.
138. The specific language, however, which refers to changes made since Robbins
"was decided" lends some support to the proposition that the Solicitor General was referring simply to the 1927 declaratory statement.
139. Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944).
140. Id. at 49.
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prior to her husband's. 1" 1 Although a test case was planned for New Mexico, 142
it did not materialize. As a result, New Mexico spouses were swept into favorable treatment on the wave of the taxpayers' victories in the other five com1 43
munity property states.
The Community PropertyExperiments

Given the real incentive of increasing tax rates, several states moved to give
the community property tax advantage to their citizens. Six states" 4 passed
legislation introducing the community property concept into their statutory
structure, and this type legislation was considered in other states. 145 The
method of granting the community property tax advantage differed in the various
states, and, as the Supreme Court held," 4 the difference was material. Two
general types of community property statutes were passed-permissive and
mandatory. 147 Oklahoma passed a permissive system which allowed spouses to
elect to operate under a community system ;148 there was no requirement that
they do so, since the common law system of property was left in operation for
spouses who did not elect the community system. In light of the Supreme Court
ruling that contracts between husbands and wives attempting to shift the incidence of taxation were not effective for tax purposes,1 49 the comparison to
what Oklahoma was allowing by statute was inevitable. When the litigation
over the tax treatment under the statute reached the Supreme Court, 150 several
commentators hoped that the whole issue of favoritism to community property
spouses would be reappraised by the Court.151 The Court, however, brushed
141. See notes 49, 122 and 132 supra and accompanying text.
142. Donworth, supra note 107, at 166.
143. Spouses in the other two community property states, Idaho and Nevada, were
swept along as well. Mim. 3853, X-1 Cum. Bull. 139 (1931).
144. More precisely, at the time it was five states and Hawaii. Hawaii: Hawaii Laws
1945, act 273; Michigan: Mich. Laws 1947, act 317; Nebraska: Neb. Laws 1947, ch. 156;
Oklahoma: Okla. Laws 1939, ch. 62, repealed by Okla. Laws 1945, tit. 32, § 16; a new
community property law was enacted by Okla. Laws 1945, tit. 32; Oregon: Ore. Laws
1943, ch. 440, repealed by Ore. Laws 1945, ch. 270; a new community property law was
enacted by Ore. Law 1947, ch. 525; Pennsylvania:Penn. Laws 1947, No. 550. The Pennsylvania statute was declared unconstitutional by the state supreme court in Willcox v.
Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A.2d 521 (1947). According to the court: "It
follows, therefore, that the Community Property Law is not only 'vague, indefinite and
uncertain' but so 'incomplete, conflicting and inconsistent in its provisions' that it is
incapable either of rational interpretation or of judicial enforcement .... " 55 A.2d at 531.
145. See Trammell, The Tax Advantages of a Community Property System, I Ark. L.
Rev. 40 (1946).
146. Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944).
147. Both of the statutes which were passed prior to the decision in Harmon, note
146 supra, were the permissive type: Oklahoma and Oregon, see note 144 supra.
148. Okla. Laws 1939, ch. 62.
149. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). See note 4 supra.
150. Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944).
151. See, for example, Cahn, supra note 137, at 677-78.
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aside any such reappraisal by distinguishing Poe v. Seaborn 152 with the pronouncement that the Court "was not dealing with a consensual community
[in Seaborn] but one made an incident of marriage by the inveterate policy of
the State.' 153 Mr. Justice Douglas very appropriately pointed out in dissent
that there was no substantial difference whether the state set up community
property tenets as mandatory and then allowed the spouses to transmute the
community property into separate property--or whether, as in Oklahoma, they
set up a common law policy and allowed a transmutation into community
property. 54 After the Oklahoma act was declared ineffectual to change the
tax consequences,' 55 of course, it was repealed and another community property statute establishing a mandatory system was enacted.' 56 And, regardless
of the logic of the matter, switching the order of transmutation worked, since
the Bureau of Internal Revenue allowed the new statute to shed the community
property tax advantages on Oklahoma spouses. 157 The community property
experiments were short-lived, because the 1948 Revenue Act15s established a
"tax community property system" for all spouses.' 59
Taxation of Faenily Income: The 1948 Revenue act' 60
In 1948, Congress, after years of hearing criticism of the unfair advantages
to spouses in community property states,' 6 ' enacted the joint return provisions
152. 282 U.S. 101 (1930). See note 120 supra and accompanying text.
153. Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44, 46 (1944). See Latcham, In'vasions of
the Community Property Income Tax Privileges, 20 Wash. L. Rev. 44 (1945) ;Friedland,
Community Propertyand its Federal Tax Problems, 23 Taxes 326 (1945) ; Note, 40 II. L.
Rev. 136 (1945) ; Note, 10 Mo. L. Rev. 312 (1945) ; and Note, 23 Texas L. Rev. 291
(1945).

154. There may be a 'consensual' community within a so-called 'legal' community.
In some of the so-called 'legal' community property states separate property of
one spouse may be converted by contract or deed into community property or
vice versa.... And it has been supposed since Poe v. Seaborn that income from
that type of community property was not thereafter to be treated as the separate
property of the spouse who originally owned it.... If Poe v. Seaborn states the
correct rule, that view seems irrefutable. Community property is no less created
'by law' whether it was created by the contract of marriage or by a post-nuptial
agreement.

Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44,54-55 (1944).
155. Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944).
156. Okla. Laws 1945, tit. 32.
157. I.T. 3782, 1946-1 Cum. Bull. 84. The Bureau of Internal Revenue further ruled
that the Hawaii community property act, since "there is no elective or consensual provision in the statute," would permit the filing of separate returns reporting one-half of
the community property in each by Hawaii spouses. I.T. 3784, 1946-1 Cum. Bull. 85.
158. Ch. 168, §§ 301, 303, 62 Stat. 110.
159. See Note, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 332 (1950).
160. Ch. 168, §§ 301, 303, 62 Stat. 110. See Rubin & Champagne, Some Community
PropertyAspects of the 1948 Revenue Act, 9 La. L. Rev. 1 (1948).
161. See, for example, Bruton, The Taxation of Family Income, 41 Yale L.J. 1172
(1932) ; Altman, Community Property:Avoiding Avoidance by Adoption in the Revenue
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which were incorporated into the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. 162 In this
fashion, spouses in the non-community property states were given, in essence,
the advantages which theretofore had been available only to community property spouses. Husband and wife were allowed to lump their income and
deductions into one return, and the tax levied was twice the amount payable
if the taxable income were only one-half the total.' 63 The result equals precisely
the tax which would be paid by husband and wife if they had filed separate returns dividing equally the income and deductions for the separate returns.
Various advantages, nevertheless, may still be enjoyed by spouses who receive
community income in the community property states. If the husband and wife
have a capital loss from the sale or exchange of community property, a $2000
deduction from gross income may be taken, instead of $1000, if the spouses
16le separate returns. 6 If one of the spouses in the community property state
has greater medical expenses than the other, by filing separate returns the
adjusted gross income figure will be lower for the spouse with the greater medical expense, and thus a greater deduction for that expense can be taken. 165 In
addition, there are several fact patterns which do not admit of filing joint
returns: when either spouse is a nonresident alien at any time during the taxable year; 166 when a divorce or legal separation occurs during the taxable
year; 167 when the husband and wife have different taxable years;1 68 and finally,
if a death of one of the spouses occurs during the taxable year, and the executor
or administrator of the decedent disaffirms the joint return.' 69

II
ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY

A dministrativeDetermination

In 1916 Congress passed the first draft17 0 of the estate tax provisions which,
after various additions and changes, are contained in the 1954 Internal ReveAct, 16 Taxes 138 (1938) ; Altman, Community Property and Joint Returns, 19 Taxes
588 (1941) ; Foley, Federal Corrective for Community Property Inequity, 26 Taxes 236
(1948) ; and Altman, The Tax Nationalization of Community Property, 26 Taxes 14
(1948).
162. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2 and § 6013.
163. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2(a) provides: "In the case of a joint return of a husband and wife under section 6013, the tax imposed by section 1 shall be twice the tax
which would be imposed if the taxable income were cut in half...
164. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1211 (b).
165. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 213. See Int. Rev. Serv. Doc. No. 5192, "Community
Property" 6 (1961) for a "work sheet" illustrating a tax saving which would result from
filing separate returns by husband and wife.
166. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6013 (a) (1).
167. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6013 (d) (2).
168. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6013 (a) (2).
169. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6013 (a) (3).
170. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 200-12, 39 Stat. 777.
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nue Code. 171 Under the 1916 Revenue Act the value of the gross estate was
determined by including property "to the extent of the interest therein of the
decedent at the time of his death which after his death is subject to the payment of the charges against his estate and the expenses of its administration
and is subject to distribution as part of his estate."' 1 72 In addition, the gross
estate included property: transferred in contemplation of death ;173 transferred
with the intent to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death ;174
and "held jointly or as tenants in the entirety by the decedent and any other
person . . . except such part thereof as may be shown to have originally be-

longed to such other person and never to have belonged to the decedent."' 175
The statute obviously was patterned to provide for property held under a
common law form of ownership, and no attention was given to the problems
which might arise when the ownership of community property would be involved. Facing the Treasury Department, therefore, was the task of placing
square community property pegs into round common law holes.
One year after the passage of the 1916 Revenue Act, and several years before
issuing its first ruling on the division of community income, 176 the Treasury
Department rammed its first peg. 177 By statute Texas granted the surviving
spouse, whether husband or wife, one-half of the community property and, in
addition, the other half of the community property if the decedent had not
made a testamentary disposition and was not survived by a child or the descendants of the child. 178 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled that in Texas
only one-half of the community property should be included in the decedent's
gross estate. 179 At issue, in the Commissioner's judgment, was whether the sub171. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2001-2209.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
text.
177.
178.

§ 202(a), 39 Stat. 777.
Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202(b), 39 Stat. 777.
Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202 (b), 39 Stat. 777.
Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202 (c), 39 Stat. 778.
O.D. 285, 1 Cum. Bull. 189 (1919) ; see notes 57 and 58 supra and accompanying

T.D. 2450,19 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 38 (1917).
Tex. Laws 1887, ch. 96, § 1. The statute read:
Upon the dissolution of the marriage relation by death, all property belonging to the community estate of the husband and wife shall go to the survivor, if
there be no child or children of the deceased or their descendants; but if there
be a child or children of the deceased, or descendants of such child or children,
then the survivor shall be entitled to one-half of said property, and the other
half shall pass to such child or children or their descendants. But such descendants shall inherit only such portion of said property as the parent through whom
they inherit would be entitled to if alive.
This provision is still the applicable law in Texas. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 45 (1956).
In addition, however, one final sentence has been added to the 1887 enactment: "In every
case, the community estate passes charged with the debts against it." Tex. Prob. Code
Ann. § 45 (1956).
179. T.D. 2450, 19 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 38 (1917).
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section of the estate tax provisions which required the inclusion of jointly held
property was applicable to Texas community property:
If, under the Texas law, property conveyed to a husband or wife during their marriage is taken by each in entirety and in such a manner
that it could not be contended that any specific part belonged to either,
but that each was then owner of all and upon the death of either no
new interest or title vested in the survivor, as is the case in some States,
the Government, under a strict and technical interpretation of paragraph C of section 202, would perhaps be justified in demanding that
the whole of the property thus owned be included as a portion of the
gross estate of the decendent. This, however, does not seem to have
been the intent of Congress . .. .18
Besides reflecting the Commissioner's defective understanding of the nature
of Texas community property law,"" the ruling suggests an attempt to construe the intent of Congress. Nothing appears in the Senate and House reports
on which such a construction might be based,' 8 2 and whatever, if anything,
formed the hypothesis for the Commissioner's construction is unavailable for
perusal.
In the Treasury Decisions which allowed a split of community income by
spouses in all community property states except California the department also
granted the privilege of splitting the community property for estate tax pur8 4
poses. l8 3 The administrative rationale for a division of community income,1
therefore, was equally applicable to a determination of the community property
includible in a decedent's gross estate. If both the spouses had "vested interests"
in the community property only one-half would be included in the gross estate
of the first to die. If, however, the wife lacked a "vested interest" there was no
inclusion in her gross estate, and if the husband died first there was an inclusion
of all the community property in his gross estate.
8
The Ninth CircuitResponds: Wardell v. Blum '

During the period when the Treasury Department was issuing its rulings,
180. Id. at 39-4-0.
181. The Commissioner's hypothesis that Texas community property law could be
compared to an estate by the entirety was ill informed; the most reasonable comparison-if one had to be made to a common law estate-would have been of community
property to joint tenancy, but it was difficult for the Commissioner to abandon the common-law notion that husband and wife were one.
182. H.R. Rep. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916) ; S. Rep. No. 793, 64th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1916) ; and H.R. Rep. No. 1200, 64th Cong,, 1st Sess. (1916). These reports are
reprinted in 1939-1 Cum. Bull. Pt. 2, 22-42.
183. T.D. 3071, 3 Cum. Bull. 221 (1920), and T.D. 3138, 4 Cum. Bull. 238 (1921). See
notes 61 and 62 supra and accompanying text.

184. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
185. 276 Fed. 226 (9th Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 617 (1922).
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California taxpayers started litigation over what they contended was unjustified
discrimination against California spouses. In 1917 the California legislature
had passed two statutes' 86 upon which taxpayers based their arguments that
only one-half of the community property should be included in the gross estate
of the California husband. The first provided that the wife must join with the
husband in any lease, sale or encumbrance of community real property, 8 7 and
the second pronounced that the wife should not be deemed as receiving onehalf of the community property on the death of the husband as heir and that
her half of the community property should not be subject to the California inheritance tax imposed at the husband's death.' 88
In Blum v. Wardell, 8 9 the executors of Blum had paid under protest the
amount of estate tax imposed as a result of including all of the community property in Blum's gross estate. The district court, construing the 1917 California
enactments, 19° upheld the claim of the executors and found that the statutes gave
the California wife a "valid, subsisting, vested interest and estate in the community property,"'' l and, therefore, only one-half of the community property
should have been included in Blum's gross estate.
On appeal, in Wardell v. Blum, 19 2 the Ninth Circuit based their affirmance
of the district court judgment on a different ground. Pointing to the language
of the 1916 Revenue Act which governed inclusions in the gross estate, 19 3 the
court said:
[W]e not only see nothing in the above quoted provision of the United
States statute to indicate any intention to impose a federal inheritance
tax upon the wife's half of the community property which the [California] statute . ..expressly declares passes to the wife not as . ..
heir, but the federal statute, as will be seen, expressly declares as
one of the essential conditions to the imposition of a federal inheritance
tax that the net estate
of the decedent shall be 'subject to distribution
' 19 4
as part of his estate.
186. Cal. Laws 1917, ch. 583, § 2 and Cal. Laws 1917, ch. 589, § 1(2).
187. Cal. Laws 1917, ch. 583, § 2. See note 87 supra. Under this 1917 statute the husband was denied the power to make a gift of community personalty without a valuable
consideration; this rule had been applicable to both community personalty and community realty before the statute was passed. See notes 48 and 87 supra.
188. Cal. Laws 1917, ch. 589, § 1 (2): "[TJhe one-half of the community property
which goes to the surviving wife on the death of the husband ... shall not be deemed to
pass to her as heir . . . and . . . shall not be subject to the provisions of this act ...."

189. 270 Fed. 309 (N.D. Cal. 1920), aff'd, 276 Fed. 226 (9th Cir. 1921), cert. denied,
258 U.S. 617 (1922).
190. See note 186 supra.
191. 270 Fed. at 314.
192. 276 Fed. 226 (9th Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 617 (1922).
193. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202, 39 Stat. 777. See notes 173-75 supra and
accompanying text.
194. 276 Fed. at 228. (Emphasis the court's.)
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The court was willing to base its decision upon that ground, but the opinion
added that even if the 1917 statutes did not control the result, the wife in California had a greater interest than an expectant heir.1 95 One justice, in dissent,
reached the conclusion that all the community property should have been included in Blum's gross estate, because he believed the 1917 statutes did not
change the nature of the wife's interest from an expectancy to a vested interest. 196
After the Blum case had been decided by the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme
Court had refused certiorari,' 97 the Secretary of the Treasury requested an
opinion from the Attorney General' 98 reconsidering the earlier opinion which
had distinguished California community property from that of other states for
estate tax purposes.' 99 The Attorney General responded that the wife in California had a vested interest in the community property and that upon the hus200
band's death her vested one-half should not be included in his gross estate.
Although the Attorney General only referred to estate tax results, the Treasury
Department saw the word "vested" and issued a ruling that for both income
201
and estate tax purposes community property in California could be divided.
The Attorney General quickly corrected the hasty action by the Treasury by
issuing another opinion pointing out that the earlier opinion was meant to apply
only to estate taxation; 202 the Treasury then issued another decision modifying
the prior decision. 203 As things came to rest at this point the Treasury Department required that only one-half of the community property be included in the
gross estate of a deceased spouse in California.
The Ninth CircuitBackpedals: Talcott v. United States

204

About a year after the Treasury Department issued its ruling allowing a
division of California community property upon the death of a spouse, United
States v. Robbins was decided by the United States Supreme Court. 2 5 Although
Robbins dealt with the income taxation of California community property, 20 6
it caused The Treasury Department to have further thoughts about the estate
taxation of California community property. As a result the Treasury Depart195. The court quoted from Arnett v. Reade, 220 U.S. 311 (1911), but offered no explanation why the holding of that case would be applicable. 276 Fed. at 228. See notes
23-25 supra and accompanying text.
196.
197.
198.
199.
porated
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

276 Fed. at 228-33 (dissenting opinion).
258 U.S. 617 (1922).
See 34 Ops. Att'y Gen. 376 (1924).
The earlier opinion was 32 Ops. Att'y Gen. 435 (1921), which had been incorinto T.D. 3138,4 Cum. Bull. 238 (1921). See note 183 supra.
34 Ops. Att'y Gen. 376 (1924).
T.D. 3568, I11-1 Cum. Bull. 84 (1924), and T.D. 3569, 111-1 Cum. Bull. 91 (1924).
34 Ops. Att'y Gen. 395 (1924).
T.D. 3670, IV-1 Cum. Bull. 19 (1925).
23 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 604 (1928).
269 U.S. 315 (1926). See notes 100 and 103 supra and accompanying text.
See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
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ment requested that the Attorney General reconsider his former opinion which
had resulted in the Treasury Decision authorizing the inclusion of only one-half
of the community property in the California decedent's gross estate. 20 7 The
Attorney General, upon reconsideration, withdrew his former opinion and advised the Treasury Department to litigate the problem. 20 8 A Treasury Decision was then issued requiring the inclusion in the gross estate of the entire
value of the community property upon the death of a California husband. 20 9
While the Treasury Department was playing hop-scotch with rulings on the
matter, a California widow, named Talcott, stepped on the chalk mark when
she entered the game. After the decision in W/ardell v. Blum 210 had been issued,
the California Supreme Court announced that the 1917 enactments by the California legislature2 1x had not changed the nature of the wife's expectancy in
community property. 2 12 In 1919 Congress had added several further bases for
inclusions of property in the gross estate: 2 13 (a) the value at the time of the
decedent's death of property "to the extent of any interest therein of the surviving spouse, existing at the time of the decedent's death as dower, courtesy,
or by virtue of a statute creating an estate in lieu of dower or courtesy;' '214
(b) passing under a general power of appointment exercised by the decedent ;215
and (c) proceeds of life insurance policies. 2 16 In 1919 Mrs. Talcott's husband
died; in 1920 she, as executrix, paid estate taxes on his gross estate which included the full value of the community property in accordance with the Treasury policy then applicable. Two years later the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed a deficiency, and Mrs. Talcott paid the additional tax. In 1925,
when the Treasury Department changed its ruling and allowed the inclusion
of only one-half of the community property in the gross estate, 2 17 Mrs. Talcott
applied for a refund of the taxes paid because of the inclusion of her one-half
of the community property in her husband's gross estate. The Commissioner
allowed the refund of taxes paid under the additional assessment, but denied
the claim as to the first payment on the ground that the statute of limitations
207. See 35 Ops. Att'y Gen. 89 (1926).
208. "I feel constrained, therefore, to withdraw the former opinion so as to leave you
free to litigate to a final conclusion in the Supreme Court of the United States the question whether in California, on the prior death of the husband, the entire community
property should be included in his gross estate." 35 Ops. Att'y Gen. 89, 99 (1926).
209. T.D. 3891, V-2 Cum. Bull. 232 (1926).
210. 276 Fed. 226 (9th Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 617 (1922). See note 192
supra and accompanying text.
211. See notes 186-88 supra and accompanying text.
212. Stewart v. Stewart, 199 Cal. 318, 249 Pac. 197 (1926), and Roberts v. Wehmeyer, 191 Cal. 601, 218 Pac. 22 (1923).
213. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402, 40 Stat. 1097.
214. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402 (b), 40 Stat. 1097.
215. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(e), 40 Stat. 1097.
216. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402 (f), 40 Stat. 1098.
217. T.D. 3670, IV-1 Cum. Bull. 19 (1925). See note 203 supra and accompanying text.
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had run. Two months after the Robbins case had been decided, 21s Mrs. Talcott
brought action in the district court to recover the additional refund. When the
Treasury Department again changed the rule in T. D. 3891,219 the government
counterclaimed for the taxes which had been refunded to Mrs. Talcott.
The district court 220 found against Mrs. Talcott on her claim and allowed
the government to recover the amount of its counterclaim. The court stated
tersely: "Stewart v Stewart . . . and U.S. v. Robbins . . . foreclose all' ar221
gument, supersede Wardell v. Blum . . . and require the conclusion herein.
On appeal, in Talcott v. United States,222 the Ninth Circuit felt that a somewhat more elaborate analysis was needed. The decision in Wardell v. Blum 223
had rested on the failure of Congress to provide an inclusionary provision which
would apply to the wife's share of the community property upon the death of
the husband ;224 the court felt that Congress had remedied this in the 1918
Revenue Act 225 by providing for an inclusion in the gross estate of the value
of the interest of the surviving spouse as curtesy or dower or by virtue of a
statute creating an estate in lieu thereof. 226 Pointing to an early California
Supreme Court decision 227 which asserted that the community property interest of the wife had been substituted for the common law right of dower, the
court observed:
That decision does not have the effect so to define the interest of the
wife in the community property that it necessarily is subject to an estate
tax under section 402(b), provided it can be ascertained that the
interest so substituted for dower is of such greater present interest
in the estate than a dower right would be, that upon the death of the
husband it is not transferred to the wife. .... But the fact that the
wife contributed to the acquisition and conservation of the community
property and during coverture is given access to the courts for the
protection of her interest, does not in itself materially distinguish her
interest from an inchoate right of dower, for it is generally held that,
while the inchoate right of dower is contingent, it is nevertheless a
228
subsisting, separate, and distinct interest ....
218. The opinion had been rendered in United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315 (1926)
in January of 1926.
219. V-2 Cum. Bull. 232 (1926). See note 209 supra and accompanying text.
220. Talcott v. United States, 21 F.2d 493 (N.D. Cal. 1927).

221. Id. at 494.
222. 23 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 604 (1928).
223. 276 Fed. 226 (9th Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 617 (1922).
supra and accompanying text.
224. See note 194 supra and accompanying text.
225. Ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057.
226. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(b), 40 Stat. 1097.
227. Beard v. Knox, 5 Cal. 252 (1855).
228. Talcott v. United States, 23 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1928).

See note 192
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In conclusion the court found that the wife's interest in California community
property was merely an expectancy, because the California courts called it
that; 229 and, because the California courts declared the wife's interest to be

a substitute for dower, the Commissioner was correct in including the full
230
value of the community property in Mr. Talcott's gross estate.
23
Effect of the Income Tax Test Cases '

The settling effect of Seaborn v. Poe 23 2 and its companion cases and United
States v. Malcolm 23 3 on the income taxation of community property has been
recorded in Part I of this article. 23 4 The Treasury Department translated the
language of the income tax cases into precisely the same syntax for estate tax
determinations involving community property. Since the wife in community
property states was considered to have a full and vested interest in one-half
of the community property, it followed that upon the death of either spouse
one-half of the community property would be included in the decedent's gross
estate.
But Not in New Mexico: Hernandez v. Becker

235

In 1921 Congress amended the estate tax provisions, 236 but the bases for
inclusion of property in the gross estate which had been itemized in the 1918
Revenue Act 23 7 were retained. In 1922 Anna Becker, who had resided in New
Mexico with her husband since their marriage in 1877, died; John Becker,
her widower, as executor of her estate filed an estate tax return under protest
in 1923. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed the estate tax on
one-half of the community property held by the Beckers at Anna's death, and
Becker paid the assessed tax under protest. In 1928 Becker filed a claim for a
refund of the entire payment of estate tax; the Commissioner rejected the claim
229. Stewart v. Stewart, 199 Cal. 318, 249 Pac. 197 (1926), and Roberts v. Wehmeyer,
191 Cal. 601, 218 Pac. 22 (1923).

230. The court concluded:
In brief, the status of the wife's interest in community property . . . is unaffected by the fact that in 1917, by an act of the Legislature, the wife's estate
on the death of her husband was relieved from the burden of the state inheritance tax. We see no escape from the conclusion that the interest of the surviving
wife, as it is finally determined by the Supreme Court of California, is of a
nature that renders it subject to taxation under the plain terms of the Federal
Revenue Act,"

23 F.2d at 901.
231. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) ; Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118 (1930)
Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930) ; and Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1930).
232. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
233. 282 U.S. 792 (1931).
234. See notes 105-43 supra and accompanying text.
235. 54 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1931).
236. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §§ 400-11, 42 Stat. 277.
237. Ch. 18, § 402, 40 Stat. 1097. See notes 213-16 supra and accompanying text.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 3

a few months later. 238 Two years later, in 1930, Becker filed suit in the District
Court for the District of New Mexico, 239 claiming a refund of the entire amount

of the estate tax paid by the estate of Anna Becker. 240 Counsel for Becker
argued that the New Mexico community property statutes were copied from
the California statutes 241 and that the pre-1927 California construction of the
nature of the wife's interest should be applied in defining the nature of the
wife's interest in New Mexico community property. 242 The United States Attorney responded that it was clear from New Mexico cases that the wife's interest in the New Mexico community property was equal with the husband's. 243
District Judge Neblett found the argument of Becker's counsel persuasive,
and it formed the rationale of his judgment in favor of Becker. Although
officially judgment was rendered for the plaintiff without reasons, 244 Judge
Neblett wrote a letter to counsel in which he stated:
238. The Commissioner in a letter dated April 19, 1928, to Becker stated:
It is contended by the estate that the decedent under the laws of New Mexico
had no vested interest in the property listed in the return other than her community interest in property which belonged to her husband and that therefore
her estate is not liable for Federal estate taxes. The Bureau is unable to agree
with the estate's contention, and holds that the community interest of this decedent in property accumulated during the marriage with her surviving husband
is subject to inclusion in her gross estate to the extent of one-half of the value
thereof at the date of death. In view of the foregoing there being no overassessment in estate tax, your claim for refund of $3,498.73 is rejected in its entirety.
Copy of letter from Commissioner to John Becker, on file with the District Court for
the District of New Mexico. I wish to record my gratitude to Mr. William D. Bryars,
clerk of the District Court for the District of New Mexico, who made available to me all
of the materials on file with the district court relating to the Becker case. The letter is reprinted: Printed Record, pp. 36-37, Hernandez v. Becker, 54 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1931).
239. No. 2085, December 1, 1930 (no reported opinion).
240. The complaint filed April 11, 1930, alleged that the property "belonged to plaintiff herein, upon the death of said Anna Becker, without administration, and was not
subject to the Federal Estate Tax or any tax whatsoever which defendant was authorized
by law to collect." Complaint on file with the District Court for the District of New Mexico. Printed Record, p. 2, Hernandez v. Becker, 54 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1931).
241. Trial brief filed by the plaintiff. On file with the District Court for the District of
New Mexico.
242. The trial brief quoted ten New Mexico community property statutory provisions
which compared to the corresponding California provisions showed precisely the same
wording. Trial Brief on file with the District Court for the District of New Mexico.
243. Trial Brief of the United States Attorney, on file with the District Court for the
District of New Mexico.
244. After the findings of facts, the trial court judgment merely stated:
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact the court concludes as a matter of
law that the property described in the complaint was not subject to a Federal
Estate tax, and that the taxes so collected by the defendant were illegally and
wrongfully collected, and that the plaintiff is entitled to a refund of the amount
so paid, with interest thereon at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the date of the respective payments.
Judgment filed December 1, 1930 in Hernandez v. Becker, No. 2085 (D. N.M. 1930).
Judgment on file with the District Court for the District of New Mexico. Printed Record,
p. 42, Hernandez v. Becker, 54 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1931).
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[T]he law affecting community property copied from the California
statutes and adopted by the New Mexico legislature in 1907 should
receive the same construction as that placed upon it by the courts of
California prior to and since its enactment in New Mexico, to the
effect that the wife has no vested interest in the community property
during the existence of the marriage relation, only an expectancy
2 45
therein on the death of the husband.
The only argument which the United States Attorney raised in his appeal
to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was that the community property which
comprised Mrs. Becker's gross estate could just as well have been acquired
prior to the adoption of the 1907 provisions, and, therefore, Mrs. Becker
246
would have had a vested interest in it under the decision in Arnett v. Reade.
Since the wife had a vested interest in the property acquired prior to 1907 and
the counsel for Becker had not shown that any of the property involved was
acquired after 1907, the district court should have accepted the thesis that
Mrs. Becker had a vested interest in the property and have rendered judgment
for the government. 24 7 Although counsel for Becker raised the issue which was
to be determinative in the decision of the Tenth Circuit,2 48 most of the counsel's brief was devoted to a showing that the wife's interest in New Mexico
community property was not vested. Ten sections of the 1907 statute establishing the New Mexico community property rules were drawn verbatim from
the California statutes ;2 49 thus, argued the counsel, the California construction
of the community property interest of the wife established by California court

decisions 250 should be followed by the court. The counsel concluded:
245. This sentence is quoted in Labovitz, The Community Property System: Its Relation to Income, Estate, and Inheritance Taxation-Part II, 9 Taxes 328 (1931). The
letter appears neither in the files of the District Court for the District of New Mexico
nor in the files of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. I wish to record my gratitude to
my colleague, Professor Robert Emmet Clark, and to Judge Sam Bratton, retired Chief
Judge of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, for their time and energy expended in
assisting me in my unsuccessful search for a copy of the letter to counsel written by Judge
Neblett. There are two factors, of course, which indicate that the quotation by Mr.
Labovitz is genuine: first is the natural respect for Mr. Labovitz's scholarly integrity and
the second is the nature of the argument of counsel which was considered by Judge
Neblett.
246. 220 U.S. 311 (1911). See notes 10-28 supra and accompanying text. See Brief for
Appellant, pp. 5-8, Hernandez v. Becker, 54 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1931).
247. Counsel for the taxpayer pounced on Mr. Justice Holmes' statement that the wife
"has a greater interest than the mere possibility of an expectant heir," 220 U.S. at 320,
to contend that the government's argument was based on the false premise that Arnett Vs.
Reade decided the wife had a vested interest. Counsel argued that Arnett v. Reade did
not decide the question of the nature of the wife's interest in community property. See
Brief for Appellee, p. 17, Hernandez v. Becker, 54 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1931).
248. See note 252 infra and accompanying text.
249. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, §§ 1, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 18 and 26. See notes 48 and 49
supra for a quotation of two of the most important provisions, §§ 16 and 26.
250. See note 212 supra and accompanying text.
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There has never been a time since New Mexico, as a territory or state,
has had the community system, when it could be said that the interest
of the wife during the marriage relation amounted to a present vested
interest in the property. It may be conceded, as was said in the case of
Stewart vs. Stewart, supra, that the interest of the wife is a much more
definite and present interest than that of an ordinary heir. Still, during the marriage relation it is not vested and vests only on the death
of the husband or other severance of the marriage relation. 251
Most of the argument on behalf of the taxpayer related to the question of
the nature of the wife's interest in New Mexico community property. There
was, nevertheless, one further point which counsel urged the Tenth Circuit to
consider: the interest of Anna Becker did not meet any of the criteria which
the 1921 Revenue Act established for the inclusion of property in the gross
estate. 252 Reliance was placed by counsel on In re Chavez's Estate,253 decided
by the New Mexico Supreme Court the year before the action was brought
in the district court by Becker; the Chavez case held that the New Mexico
inheritance tax did not apply to the interest of the wife in the community property at her death because her husband did not inherit the wife's one-half and
the statute under which the community "belongs" to the husband at the death
of the wife 254 was not a statute of inheritance, descent or distribution. 25 5 Thus,
counsel for Becker argued that the 1921 Revenue Act had no application in
251. Brief for Appellee, p. 25, Hernandez v. Becker, 54 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1931).
252. Brief for Appellee, p. 4-, Hernandez v. Becker, 54. F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1931).
Counsel for Becker dealt with only one of the inclusionary subsections of the estate tax:
namely, the provision requiring the inclusion of property to the extent of the interest of
the decedent "which after his death is subject to the payment of the charges against his
estate and the expenses of its administration and is subject to distribution as part of his
estate." Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §402(a), 42 Stat. 278. Although five other inclusionary subsections were contained in the 1921 Revenue Act, counsel for Becker ignored
them, as did the United States Attorney.
253. 34 N.M. 258, 280 Pac. 241 (1929).
254. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 26:
Upon the death of the wife, the entire community property, without administration, belongs to the surviving husband, except such portion thereof as may
have been set apart to her by a judicial decree, for her support and maintenance,
which portion is subject to her testamentary disposition, and in the absence of
such disposition goes to her descendants, or heirs, exclusive of her husband.
255. The majority in the Chavez case felt there was "no reason why the Legislature
is not able to provide survivorship in favor of one spouse and deny it to another while
recognizing that so long as they live and remain members of the marital community the
rights of one are not of an inferior nature to those of the other." In re Chavez's Estate,
34 N.M. 258, 265, 280 Pac. 241, 243 (1929). The dissenting justices, on the other hand,
were convinced that if the wife's interest is a present vested interest, "the conclusion is
necessarily true that upon the death of the wife, a transmission of her interest in the
community property occurs ... whether said section [N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 26; see
note 254 supra] be regarded as a statute of descent and distribution or 'other statute'
within the contemplation of the succession tax statute." Id. at 266, 280 Pac. at 244.
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New Mexico when the wife predeceased the husband and only community
property was involved.
Judge Phillips, speaking for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hernandez v. Becker, 256 set out the provisions of the 1921 Revenue Act which governed the inclusion of property in a decedent's gross estate,257 and then he proceeded to indicate the reasons for the court's conclusion that those provisions
did not require the inclusion of one-half of the community property in Mrs.
Becker's gross estate. Although the court quoted from two United States Supreme Court decisions 258 which illustrated that local technicalities relating to
the estates of decedents were not controlling in federal estate tax determinations, no attempt was made to extract a rationale to apply in the Becker case. 259
First on the court's agenda was a showing that the wife's interest in New
Mexico community property was not subject to the estate tax provision including property in the gross estate which after the decedent's death "is subject
to distribution as part of his estate. '"2 60 This was the court's easiest job, because
the New Mexico Supreme Court had held only two years before that the wife's
interest in the community property did not form a part of her estate at her
death. 26 1 In addition the inclusionary subsection required that the interest be
subject to the expenses of administration and charges against her estate; neither
of these two requirements was met, because the New Mexico statute 26 2 did not
make the wife's share of community property subject to these charges.
The court gave little attention to the estate tax subsection which required
inclusion of the "interest of the surviving spouse existing at the time of the
decedent's death as dower, curtesy, or by virtue of a statute creating an estate
256. 54 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1931).
257. The critical inclusionary provisions of the 1921 Revenue Act were as follows:
Sec. 402. That the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined
by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal,
tangible or intangible, wherever situated(a) To the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his
death which after his death is subject to the payment of the charges against his
estate and the expenses of its administration and is subject to distribution as part
of his estate;
(b) To the extent of any interest therein of the surviving spouse, existing at
the time of the decedent's death as dower, curtesy, or by virtue of a statute creating an estate in lieu of dower or curtesy ....
. * *
(d) To the extent of the interest therein held jointly or as tenants by the
entirety by the decedent and any other person ....
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 402, 42 Stat. 278.
258. Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497 (1930), and Chase Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929).
259. 54 F.2d at 549.
260. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 402(a), 42 Stat. 278. See note 257 supra.
261. In re Chavez's Estate, 34 N.M. 258, 280 Pac. 241 (1929).
262. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 26. See note 254 .rupra.
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in lieu of dower or curtesy." 263 This problem was answered by stating that
"the common law rights of dower and curtesy have never obtained in New
Mexico, and section 26, supra,[ 2641 did not create an estate in lieu of cur-

26
tesy. ' '265 No mention was made by the court of Talcott v. United States, "
although the case was cited in another regard earlier in the opinion.26 7 The Talcott case could have been distinguished by the court on the basis that the wife's
interest is less than the husband's, and thus there is a different problem when
the wife predeceases her husband ;268 but the court was later to pull the props
from this kind of analysis by arguing in dictum that the wife has a "vested"
interest in the community property. 26 9 A relatively strong case could have been
advanced by the court to support the proposition that the statutory interests in
community property in New Mexico were in lieu of dower and curtesy. The
inclusionary provision of the 1921 Revenue Act 270 did not require that the

common law rights of dower and curtesy have been abandoned in favor of a

statutory provision in lieu thereof; the court's summary dismissal of the provision on that ground was not justified and demonstrates the court's unwillingness
to be guided by the broad construction given to the estate tax provisions by the
Supreme Court. 27' Three separate arguments could have been advanced to call
for the inclusion of the interest of the surviving spouse held because of a statutory provision granting the interest in lieu of curtesy: First of all, the New
Mexico case of Beals v. Ares2 7 2 had established the rule that the common law
had applied in New Mexico since 1876. Since curtesy is a common law estate
in property, the court might have argued, and since it has not obtained in New
Mexico since 1876, some statutory provision must supersede it; and the obvious
statutory provision is the community property provision granting the husband
the community property upon the death of the wife. 273 A second line of argument could have been proposed by the court: from 1887 to 1889 statutory rights
263. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 402(b),42 Stat. 278.
264. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 26. See note 254 supra.
265. 54 F.2d at 547.
266. 23 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 604 (1928). See note 228 supra
and accompanying text.
267. 54 F.2d at 544.
268. The Talcott case involved a husband's estate when he predeceased his wife. Since
the wife's interest was clearly inferior to her husband's, less problem about comparing
it to dower was present than would have been true if the wife had predeceased her
husband and an attempt to compare his interest to curtesy had been made. See note 228
supra and accompanying text.
269. See note 294 infra and accompanying text.
270. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 402 (b), 42 Stat. 278. See note 257 supra.
271. Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497 (1930) and Chase Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929). See note 258 supra and accompanying text.
272. 25 N.M. 459, 185 Pac. 780 (1919). See text accompanying note 71 supra.
273. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 26.
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similar to dower and curtesy were a part of New Mexico law. 274 Thus, when
statutory community property provisions were enacted in 1889275 and the dower
and curtesy provisions were repealed, 276 New Mexico had enacted statutory
provisions in lieu of dower and curtesy. Finally, in the statutory scheme enacted
by the New Mexico legislature in 1907 there was an express provision that "no
estate is allowed the husband as tenant by courtesy ....
-277 The provisions
relating to community property interests could have been construed by the court
as in lieu of the estate expressly excluded by that provision. The data needed
to form each of these three arguments was available to the court; within the
opinion the court had alluded to the statutory rights "analogous to dower and
courtesy" which had applied from 1887 to 1889 ;278 the provision denying
the estate of curtesy; 279 and the conclusion of Beals v. Ares that the common
law had applied in New Mexico since 1876.280
Last, and most important, in the sequence of estate tax provisions to be discarded by the court was that requiring the inclusion in the gross estate of property held jointly by the decedent and some other person. 28 The court started
its discussion with the following erroneous statement: "The Supreme Court
construed the words 'held jointly' to mean a joint tenancy, in Reinecke v.
Northern Trust Co. .... ,"282 Northern Trust Co. 28 3 did not involve jointly
held property; the Court used the words "joint tenancy" in giving a shorthand
summary of the inclusionary provisions of the estate tax statute, but no attempt
was made by the Court to construe the meaning of "held jointly." 28 4 Once the
274. N.M. Laws 1887, ch. 32, § 19 provided: "If a wife die testate or intestate, leaving
a widower, one-third of her real estate shall descend to him, subject however, to its proportion of the debts of the wife contracted before marriage." This provision was repealed
by N.M. Laws 1889, ch. 90, § 49.
275. N.M. Laws, 1889, ch. 90.
276. N.M. Laws 1889, ch. 90, § 49.
277. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 17.
278. 54 F.2d at 544.
279. Id. at 545.
280. Ibid.
281. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 402(d), 42 Stat. 278. See note 257 supra.
282. 54 F.2d at 547.
283. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929). The 1924 Revenue Act
changed the language of the 1921 act to the following: "(e) To the extent of the interest
therein held as joint tenants by the decedent and spouse . . . ." Ch. 234 § 302(e), 43 Stat.
304. Although the Court in Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. was dealing with the 1921
statute, the summary statement could very well have been drawn from the language
of the provision after the 1924 act had been passed. Certainly there was no attempt to
construe what the 1921 act meant by "held jointly." The committee reports shed no light
on why the Congress changed the language to joint tenancy. The only statement in reference to the amendment of the provision noted: "The provisions of the House bill and
the existing law have been reworded to secure greater clarity." S. Rep. No. 398, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 Cum. Bull. Pt. 2, 290.
284. 278 U.S. at 348.
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court in Becker had hypothesized that the inclusionary provision applied only
to joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety, it was then easy work to demonstrate the difference between community property and those common law
estates. The court declared that a "unity of interests" is necessary to a joint
tenancy; since the interests of New Mexico spouses "are not equal" and since
the "very same statute that provides for this community estate also provides
for joint tenancy," 215 the jointly held community property could not be a joint
tenancy. Although the court relied strongly on In re Chavez's Estate286 in
another regard, 2 7 no mention of the New Mexico court's construction of the
community property statute 288 as creating an estate similar to joint tenancy was
mentioned in the Becker opinion. The court in the Chavez case had said:
As the Legislature has recognized the estate known as joint tenancy,
wherein as an incident there is the vesting of the entire estate in the survivor, not by inheritance but by virtue of the creation of the estate,
so it has created another and different class of tenancy known as
community property, wherein this right of survivorship inures as to the
husband, if he survives, but only as to the half if
entire estate of the
28 9
the wife survives.
If the court in Becker had wished to construe the estate tax statute broadly,
sufficient basis could have been found in the inclusionary provisions to cause
the wife's interest in the community property to be included in her gross estate.
The real problem facing the court, I submit, was the realization that the
"interests of the two spouses are not equal." 290 And, yet, the court hesitated
at making this argument of Becker's counsel 291 the rationale of its decision,
for if it did so the whole cycle of income and estate tax problems which had
been through the mill in California would start afresh in New Mexico.
To make doubly sure that this construction would not be given its decision,
the court in the concluding paragraphs of the opinion responded in dictum to
the basic contention urged by the Collector of Internal Revenue. His position had
been, since the claim for refund first had been made,292 that the wife in New
Mexico had a vested interest in the community property, and, therefore, onehalf of the property over which she held a vested interest must have passed
285. Hernandez v. Becker, 54 F.2d 542, 547, 548 (10th Cir. 1931).
286. 34 N.M. 258, 280 Pac. 241 (1929). See note 261 supra and accompanying text.
287. The court used the Chavez case to show that the community property was not
part of the wife's estate, and thus §402(a) of the 1921 Revenue Act would not apply.
See notes 260-62 supra and accompanying text.
288. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 26.
289. In re Chavez's Estate, 34 N.M. 258, 263, 280 Pac. 241, 243 (1929).
290. Hernandez v. Becker, 54 F.2d 542, 548 (10th Cir. 1931).
291. See notes 249-51 supra and accompanying text.

292. See note 238 supra.
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from her to her husband at her death. It should be noted that everything the
court said in response to the collector's contention was gratuitous dictum,
because just prior to their discussion of the point the court held: "We conclude
that no estate was transferred on the death of the wife, either within the meaning of the general language of section 401, supra, or the specific language of
sections 402(a), (b), or (d), supra. ' '2 93 In formulating the argument the
court concocted a fantastic notion: the wife's interest in community property
remains unaffected by her power over the community property at her death!
The court suggested that the "Legislature in no manner undertook to limit or
restrict the vested rights of the wife during her life. It merely provided what
should happen upon her death. ' 2 9 4 The court then proposed that up to the
second before her death she has a vested interest in one-half of the community
property, but at the moment of her death, as if by magic, all the community
property belongs to her husband and nothing has passed from her to him. "If
the Legislature could provide that the entire community estate should descend
to the husband on the death of the wife, we fail to see why it could not provide, as it undertook to do, that on the death of the wife the whole estate by
virtue of the community relation should belong to the husband. ' 29 5 Indeed,
"belongs" surely must be added to the incantations of the magicians, for it is
a powerful talisman. For one moment the wife had a vested interest in one-half
of the community property and a moment later she had no interest, but the
property interest vanished into a limbo known only to those to whom the job
of deciding federal tax cases is given.
Limiting Community Property Advantages: The Revenue Act of 1942296

Although most of the hue and cry against tax favoritism afforded community
property residents had focused on the income tax, 297 Congress' first effort to
correct the ifiequity was an amendment of the estate tax provisions of the 1939
Internal Revenue Code. 298 In 1942 Congress added the following to the provision of the 1939 Code which included property in the gross estate:
(2) Community Interests.-To the extent of the interest therein
held as community property by the decedent and surviving spouse
under the law of any State, Territory, or possession of the United
States, or any foreign country, except such part thereof as may be
shown to have been received as compensation for personal services
actually rendered by the surviving spouse or derived originally from
such compensation or from separate property of the surviving spouse.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

54 F.2d at 549.
Ibid.
Id. at 550.
Ch. 619, 56 Stat. 798. Title IV, Part I, dealing with the estate tax: 56 Stat. 941.
See note 161 supra.
§ 811 (e)(2), 56 Stat. 942.
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In no case shall such interest included in the gross estate of the decedent
be less than the value of such part of the community property as was
subject to the decedent's power of testamentary disposition.2 99
Congress also amended the inclusionary provisions relating to the proceeds of
life insurance3 0 0 and transfers in contemplation of death3 0 ' to correspond with
this general rule. The provisions incorporated a rule similar to that employed
in the provision treating joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety under
30 2
the 1939 Code.
Under the 1942 act, because local rules of ownership were irrelevant, the
result in Hernandez v. Becker 303 would follow only if the husband was shown
to be the economic source3 0 4 of the entire community property. If it proved
impossible to trace the source of the community property to the husband, however, some amount of the community property would be included in the wife's
gross estate. At the death of the husband, on the other hand, if the entire community property was economically attributable to the wife, an inclusion of onehalf of the value would be made in the husband's gross estate, because of his
power of testamentary disposition over one-half.30 5 And, if the entire community property was traceable back to the husband the full value of the community property would be included in his gross estate. No problems relating
to the transmutation of separate property into New Mexico community property s were raised during the period that the 1942 provisions were in effect,307
299. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(e) (2), 56 Stat. 942. See the discussion of the provisions in Paul, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation 72-82 (1946 Supp.).
300. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811 (g) (4), 56 Stat. 945. See Thurman, Federal Estate
and Gift Taxation of Community Property Life Insurance, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 239, 242-45

(1957).

301. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811 (d) (5), S6 Stat. 941.
302. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(e), redesignated as § 811(e) (1) by the Revenue
Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 402(b), 56 Stat. 942, and returned to §811 (e) by the Revenue
Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 351, 62 Stat. 116.
303. 54 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1931). The result referred to, of course, is no inclusion
of the community property in the gross estate of the wife when she predeceases her
husband in New Mexico.
304. See T.D. 5239, 1943 Cum. Bull. 1081, 1085-86.
305. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 27 provided: "Upon the death of the husband one-half
of the community property goes to the surviving wife and the other half is subject to
the testamentary disposition of the husband . . . ." Under the 1942 Revenue Act provision quoted in the text (at note 299 supra) the amount of community property over which
the decedent spouse held a power of testamentary disposition was included in the gross
estate, regardless of the generating source of the community property.
306. Section 811(e) (2) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code added by the 1942 Revenue Act, 56 Stat. 942, required the tracing of the community property back into another
form of ownership (if such there was) and then to the generating source of the property
held in the prior form of ownership.
307. The period was 1942 to 1947. In 1948 these community property rules were repealed, effective as to estates of decedents dying after December 31, 1947. Revenue Act
of 1948, ch. 168, § 351, 62 Stat. 116.
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because of the state supreme court rule prohibiting such transmutation.30 8
When, inevitably, the constitutionality of the 1942 community property rule
was challenged by taxpayers from community property states, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the provisions.8 0 9 "The death of either the husband or
the wife . . . effects sufficient alteration in the spouses' possession and enjoy-

ment and reciprocal powers of control and disposition of the community property as to warrant the imposition of an excise tax measured by the value of the
entire community." 310
Although the purpose of the community property provisions was to achieve
equality of estate tax treatment between common-law and community property
jurisdictions,8 11 the application of the provisions switched the balance and
penalized community property estates. For example, in a common law state
where the husband has the power of testamentary disposition over all the
property, the property would escape taxation in the wife's gross estate if the
husband directed that the wife receive a life estate with the remainder passing
to his children upon her death. In a community property state, on the other
hand, where only one-half of the community property could be transferred
at death by the husband the same technique could be utilized by the husband
only as to that one-half. 312 The other one-half, however, which passed to the
wife under the local statute would be taxed in the wife's gross estate upon her
death.8 13 In the community property state, therefore, one and one-half times
the value of the community property would be taxed in the gross estates of the
spouses, but the common-law "life-estate with remainder over to the children"
would cause the inclusion of only the full value of the property in the spouses'
308. The rule was established by McDonald v. Lambert, 43 N.M. 27, 85 P.2d 78
(1938) ; reiterated in Newton v. Wilson, 53 N.M. 480, 211 P.2d 776 (1949) ; and abandoned in Chavez v. Chavez, 56 N.M. 393, 244 P.2d 781 (1952) which directly overruled

the two prior cases. Cf. Massaglia v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1961), affirming 33 T.C. 379 (1959).
309. Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945), reversing 60 F. Supp. 169 (E.D. La.
(1945), and United States v. Rompel, 326 U.S. 367 (1945), reversing 59 F. Supp. 483
(W.D. Tex. 1945). See Freeman and Mueller, Federal Taxation of Community Property,
34 Calif. L. Rev. 398 (1946).
310. United States v. Rompel, 326 U.S. 367, 370 (1946).
311. See Mr. Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S.
340, 364-65 (1945), for quotations from the House and Senate Reports referring to the
inequity.
312. Although the technique probably was not used for tax purposes at that time, if
the husband by will disposed of the entire community property, and the wife elected to
take under the will (a life estate in the full value of the community property) much the
same consequences as a common law life estate with remainder over to the children could
have been achieved. The technique has achieved results for community property estate
plans since the adoption of the 1948 Revenue Act. See United States v. Stapf, 309 F.2d
592 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Vardell v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1962) ; and Commissioner v. Siegel, 250 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1957).
313. For example, N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, §27 gave the husband a power of testamentary disposition over only one-half of the community property. See note 305 supra.
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gross estates.8 14 Difficult administrative problems, moreover, were encountered
in applying the 1942 provisions, because of the necessity of tracing the community property back to its source, in the determination of the economic contribution
8 15
of the surviving spouse.
Taxation of Family Wealth: The Revenue Act of 1948316 and the 1954 Internal Revenue Code
In 1948 Congress found itself still beset by cries of foul from income taxpayers in the non-community property states8 17 and, in addition, subject to
protests emanating from the community property states about the estate tax
provisions enacted in 1942.818 With a grand gesture Congress attempted to
please everyone 1 9 by amending the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, repealing
the 1942 community property provisions,3 20 and equalizing the tax treatment
of family wealth.8 2 ' The manner in which Congress treated the income taxation
of spouses is recorded in the first part of this article ;322 a different technique
was used to level the impact of estate taxation-the marital deduction. 23 The
marital deduction device was incorporated into the 1954 Internal Revenue Code
324
and remains an important facet of our tax structure.
By repealing the 1942 community property provisions Congress restored the
pre-1942 estate tax treatment of community property; spouses who are regarded
as each owning one-half of the community property have only that one-half
'included in their gross estates, except, of course, in New Mexico. For New
Mexico the repeal of the 1942 provisions restored the rule of Hernandez v.
Becker, 2 - so when the wife predeceases her husband no community property is
included in her gross estate. When the husband dies first, on the other hand,
only one-half of the community property is included in his gross estate, because
of the pre-1942 rule which viewed the wife as owning a "vested interest" in
one-half of the community property. 26 In all the other community property
states the husband and wife receive equal treatment at death, with an allow314. The Senate Report referred to this problem in supporting the conclusion that
the 1942 act had failed to achieve equalization. S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.

27

(1948).

315. See S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1948).

316. Ch. 168, 62 Stat. 110.
317. See note 161 supra and accompanying text.
318. See notes 313 and 314 supra and accompanying text.
319. Contra: Somewhere I have read that unmarried taxpayers were heard to remark that in 1948 Congress allowed an eight-state tail to wag a forty-state dog.
320. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 351, 62 Stat. 116.
321. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 361, 62 Stat. 117.
322. See notes 160-169 supra and accompanying text.
323. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812(e), 62 Stat. 117.
324. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056.
325. 54 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1931). See notes 256-95 supra and accompanying text.

326. See note 234 supra and accompanying text.
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ance of testamentary disposition by the deceased spouse of one-half of the community property;327 on the death of either spouse, therefore, one-half of the

community property is included in the gross estate.
Congress afforded similar treatment for non-community property wealth by

means of the marital deduction. Although all non-community property of the
spouse is included in the gross estate, 328 a deduction of the amount transferred
to the surviving spouse, 3 29 limited by one-half of the value of the adjusted
gross estate, 330 is allowed in reaching the taxable estate upon which the tax
is assessed. 331 To deny the deduction when community property is involved, the

adjusted gross estate is reduced by the amount of community property incladed
therein before determining the limitation on the amount of the marital deduc-

tion.33 2 The nature of the property actually transferred to the surviving spouse,
327. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-203 (1956) ; Cal. Prob. Code § 201; Idaho Code Ann.
§ 14-113 (1948) ; La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2406 (West 1952) ; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 123.250
(Supp. 1959); Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §45 (1956); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 11.04.050
(1963).
328. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2033-42.
329. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(a) provides that "the value of the taxable estate
shall, except as limited by subsections (b), (c), and (d), be determined by deducting
from the value of the gross estate an amount equal to the value of any interest in property
which passes or has passed from the decendent to his surviving spouse, but only to the
extent that such interest is included in determining the value of the gross estate."
330. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(c) (1) provides that "the aggregate amount of
the deductions allowed under this section . . . shall not exceed 50 percent of the value
of the adjusted gross estate, as defined in paragraph (2)."
331. In addition to the limitation mentioned, the 1954 Internal Revenue Code disallows the deduction if the interest in property passing to the surviving spouse is terminable. The rationale underlying the rule is an equalization of the effect on community
property and non-community property. In the community property state one-half (at
least) of the community property will be taxed in the estate of the last spouse to die;
if the statute allowed the husband to transfer an interest to the wife which was deductible
and which would escape taxation upon her death no equality would have been achieved.
For a discussion of the terminable interest rule, see Lowndes and Kramer, Federal
Estate and Gift Taxes 384-416 (2d ed. 1962).
332. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(c) (2) (B) provides:
(B) Special Rule in Cases Involving Community Property.-If the decedent
and his surviving spouse at any time, held property as community property ...
then the adjusted gross estate shall . . . be determined by subtracting from the
entire value of the gross estate the sum of(i) the value of property which is at the time of the death of the decedent
held as such community property; and
(ii) the value of property transferred by the decedent during his life, if at
the time of such transfer the property was held as such community property; and
(iii) the amount receivable as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent, to the extent purchased with premiums or other consideration
paid out of property held as such community property ....
In order to prevent a transmutation of community property into separate property to
take advantage of the marital deduction the Code requires that separate property which
is transmuted community property be treated the same as community property under
the provisions quoted above. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056 (c) (2) (C).
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33
whether community or non-community, is immaterial. 3 A simplified fact pattern should illustrate the operation of the deduction. Assume the following: (1)
H in New Mexico predeceases his wife; (2) H leaves at death $300,000 of community property (one-half of the total) and $600,000 of separate property;
(3) H transfers by will his one-half of the community property to W, with
no strings attached; and (4) H transfers his $600,000 of separate property
3 34
the adjusted gross estate for
to his children. Disregarding other deductions
determining the marital deduction limitation will be $600,000 (that is, $900,000, the value of the gross estate, less H's one-half of the community property).
The value of the property transferred by H to W ($300,000), limited by onehalf of the adjusted gross estate ($300,000) is the amount allowable as the
marital deduction. As a result W receives her one-half of the community property and H's one-half of the community property, and no estate tax as a result of
the transfer of the community property is paid by H's estate. If H's gross estate
had included only community property, however, no marital deduction would be
allowed, because the value of the adjusted gross estate, with all the community
property deducted, would be zero.
Congress did not achieve the desired equalization of the estate taxation of
family wealth by the provisions of the 1948 enactment; significant estate tax
advantages are still enjoyed under the community property system, except in
New Mexico.33 5 In a non-community property state if the husband accumulates
wealth which he and his wife wish to distribute to their children, they can take
advantage of the lower tax rate3 36 resulting from the use of the marital deduction only if the husband predeceases his wife. For example, if H accumulates
$5,000,000, then dies leaving his wife $2,500,000 and his children $2,500,000,
the tax on his estate is $998,000, and the tax on his wife's estate because of the
amount she received from her husband is also $998,000. Thus, the estate is
reduced by a tax erosion of about $2,000,000 when it reaches the children. If
the wife dies first, however, the entire $5,000,000 will be taxed later in H's

333. It is, of course, material whether the interest in the property of the surviving
spouse is terminable or non-terminable. See note 331 supra.
334. Under the 1954 Code provision the adjusted gross estate when no community
property is involved is arrived at by deducting losses, expenses, indebtedness and taxes.
rnt. Rev. Code of 1954, §2056(c) (1). If, however, community property and separate
property are included in the gross estate the community property and the pro-rata portion of the losses, expenses, indebtedness and taxes attributable to the separate property
are deducted in reaching the adjusted gross estate under § 2056. Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 2056(c) (2) (B) (iv).
335. New Mexico is the single exception among the community property states, because the wife's interest at her death "belongs" to the husband. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37,

§ 26 (see note 49 supra) is still a part of New Mexico Law. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-8
(1953).
336. The federal estate tax rates range from three per cent on the portion of taxable
estates up to and including $5,000 to seventy-seven per cent of the portion of the taxable

estates over $10,000,000. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2001.
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gross estate, which results in a tax of $2,486,000; this means about $500,000
more tax loss to the family.3 37 In the community property states, however,
the division of family wealth with optimum tax consequences for the family
occurs regardless of the order of deaths of the spouses; but in New Mexico,
community property treatment parallels that given non-community property
because of the inability of the wife to dispose of one-half of the community
338
property at her death.
Another advantage accruing in community property states because one-half
of the community property is attributable to the wife and included in her gross
estate is the favorable basis adjustment which is made to the community property. 339 The inclusion of one-half of the community property in the wife's gross
estate causes the entire community property to receive a stepped-up basis to
the fair market value.3 40 Assume certain property cost the community $10,000,
but, because of increased market value, at the death of the wife the property
is valued at $20,000; both the husband's and wife's shares of the community
property receive a new basis 341 equal to the fair market value. Thus, if the
husband sells his one-half of the property after his wife's death, receiving the
amount of the fair market value, instead of having $5,000 of capital gain there
will be no taxable gain on the sale. In a non-community property state, because
there is no inclusion in the wife's gross estate, no stepped-up basis is allowed.
On the husband's prior death, of course, non-community property receives treatment corresponding to that given community property; all the property included
in his gross estate (including that deducted because of the marital deduction)
3 42
receives the stepped-up basis to the fair market value.
This basis advantage, of course, is lost to New Mexico taxpayers, because of
the rule of Hernandez v. Becker3 43 that there is no inclusion of com-

munity property in the wife's gross estate when she predeceases her husband.
Professor Clark has suggested 44 that although New Mexico community prop337. This tax loss shrinks, obviously, if the taxable estate of the husband is smaller
when he dies, because of the lower tax rates. For example, on an estate of $500,000 the
tax loss to the family caused by the husband surviving his wife is about $14,000.
338. See note 335 supra.
339. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014(b) (6).
340. The Code provides for an adjustment of the basis of the surviving spouse's
half of the community property to the fair market value "if at least one-half of the whole
of the community interest in such property was includible in determining the value
of the decedent's gross estate . . . ." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014(b)

(6).

341. The original basis (if purchased by the community) would be cost. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 1012. In an inflating economy, of course, the higher basis which results
from using the fair market value will reduce the amount of taxable gain on a subsequent
sale of the property.
342. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014(b) (1).
343. 54 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1931). See note 257 supra and accompanying text.
344. Clark, Community of Property and the Family in New Mexico 36-38 (1956) and
Clark, Another Community Property Anomaly, 11 Tax L. Rev. 76, 80-81 (1955).
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erty at the death of the wife does not qualify for the special community property
provision which causes the entire community property to receive a stepped-up
basis, 345 the language of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code 346 can be interpreted
to give the wife's one-half which "belongs" to the husband 3 47 after her death
a fair market value basis. This suggestion deserves careful consideration. Prior
to the adoption of the 1948 Revenue Act the Bureau of Internal Revenue had
ruled 348 that in New Mexico when the wife predeceased her husband, the basis
for determining gain or loss on a subsequent sale of community property by the
husband would be the adjusted cost to the community. If, however, the husband
in New Mexico predeceased his wife and made a testamentary disposition of
his one-half of the community property to her, the basis on a subsequent sale
of that one-half of the community property would be the fair market value at
the husband's death; the wife's one-half, nevertheless, would have a basis of
the cost to the community.
In 1948 Congress added a proviso to the statutory section- 4 1 establishing the
basis for property received from a decedent which set the basis as the fair
market value of the entire community property if one-half thereof were included
in the decedent's gross estate.3 50 Although this section is applicable upon the
husband's death in New Mexico, it had no applicability upon the wife's prior
death. 35 ' The entire community property under the 1948 Revenue Act in the
hands of the husband after the wife's death would be the cost to the community;
this is so because the general rule under the 1939 Code, unchanged by the
1948 Revenue Act, required that the property be "acquired by bequest, devise, or
inheritance or by the decedent's estate from the decedent ' 3 52 in order to receive a new basis set at the fair market value. In 1954, however, Congress
changed the general rule to read as follows:
[T]he basis of property in the hands of a person acquiring the property
from a decedent or to whom the property passed from a decedent shall
• . . be the fair market value of the property at the date of the de353
cedent's death ....
Professor Clark's suggestion3 54 is based on a reading of this provision. "In New
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014(b) (6).
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014(a).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-8 (1953). See note 335 rupra.
I.T. 2742, XII-2 Cum. Bull. 77 (1933).
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 113 (a) (5).

350. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 366, 62 Stat. 124.

351. The requirements were the same as those adopted into the 1954 Code. Int. Rev.
Code of
352.
353.
354.

1954, § 1014(b) (6).
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 113 (a) (5).
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014(a).
See note 34-4 supra and accompanying text.
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. the community property interest does not 'pass' to the surviving

husband, nor does he inherit it. However, the surviving husband certainly
'acquires' that interest from the decedent. From whom else could he be said
to 'acquire' it?

' 3 55

Sound statutory construction, unfortunately, does not sup-

port Professor Clark's suggestion. The section of the 1954 Code 356 which treats
the determination of basis for property received from a decedent is divided into
several subsections: (.1) subsection (a) sets out the general rule; 357 (2) subsection (b) provides nine circumstances in which property "for purposes [of
the general rule] shall be considered to have been acquired from or to have
passed from the decedent" ;358 and (3)

subsection (c)

excludes from the opera-

tion of the section income received in respect of a decedent. 350 The Senate Committee Report indicates that Congress did not intend the general rule to increase
the kinds of property which would receive the stepped-up basis ;360 on the contrary, there is evidence that the nine items of subsection (b) were intended as
3 61
Thus, unless the property transfer fits within the special proexclusionary.

visions of the itemized categories of subsection (b) the general rule of subsection (a) would not cause a stepped-up basis, even if it could be said that the
property was "acquired" from a decedent. If the provisions of subsection (b)
could be interpreted as non-exclusionary, of course, Professor Clark's sugges362
tion would be sound; indeed, from whom else could he be said to acquire it,

36 3
The proper conclusion, nevertheless,
Hernandez v. Becker, notwithstanding ?

is that the administrative determination made shortly after the decision in
355. Clark, Community of Property and the Family in New Mexico 37 (1956).
356. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014.
357. See text accompanying note 353 supra.
358. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014(b).
359. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014(c).
360. "Paragraphs (1) to (9) of subsection (b) describe the circumstances 'under
which property is treated as having been acquired or having passed from the decedent."
S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 423 (1954).
361. "Your committee separated paragraphs (1) through (9) of subsection (a) of the
House bill into a new subsection (b) for greater clarity. The only substantive change
in either subsection (a) or paragraphs (1) through (8) of subsection (b) is the correction of a typographical error . . . ." S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 423 (1954).
It is also clear from the Senate Report that the only change which Congress was attempting to make was an allowance of the fair market value basis to various kinds of property included in the decedent's gross estate which was not allowed under the provisions
of the 1939 Code.
There appears to be no justification for denying some property included in a
decedent's gross estate for estate-tax purposes a new basis at date of death while
giving this new basis in most other cases. The House and your committee's bill
remove this discrimination . . . for nearly all property includible in the decedent's gross estate for estate-tax purposes.
S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1954).
362. See text accompanying note 355 supra.
363. 54 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1931). See notes 293-95 supra and accompanying text.
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Becker3 6 4 still applies when the wife predeceases her husband3 65 In New Mexico, therefore, precisely the same basis consequences attend the prior death of
the wife as in non-community property states, and the advantage which accrues
in other community property states is lost to New Mexico families.

III
CRITICISM OF PRESENT FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF
NEW MEXICO COMMUNITY PROPERTY

Analysis of Comparative Powers of Husband and Wife Over New Mexico
Community Property

New Mexico husbands are invested with the complete power of management and control of the community personal property;366 this is a facet of
community ownership which is universal throughout the community property
states.36 The statutory grant of authority, however, is more encompassing
in New Mexico than in the other community property states,3 68 except
364. I.T. 2742, XII-2 Cum. Bull. 77 (1933). See note 348 sura and accompanying
text.
365. The application of I.T. 2742, supra note 364, to New Mexico community property when the husband dies first is changed, obviously, by § 1014(b) (6) of the 1954
Internal Revenue Code. See note 340 supra.
366. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-3 (1953) provides:
The husband has the management and control of the personal property of
the community, and during coverture the husband shall have the sole power of
disposition of the personal property of the community, other than testamentary,
as he has of his separate estate; but the husband and wife must join in all deeds
and mortgages affecting real estate; Provided, that either husband or wife may
convey or mortgage separate property without the other joining in such conveyance or mortgage; and, Provided, further, that any transfer or conveyance attempted to be made of the real property of the community by either husband or
wife alone shall be void and of no effect, except, that the husband may convey
directly to the wife or the wife to the husband without the other joining in the
conveyance.
367. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-211 (1956), Mortensen v. Knight, 81 Ariz. 325, 305
P.2d 463 (1956) ; Cal. Civ. Code § 172; Idaho Code Ann. § 32-912 (1948), "except the
earnings of the wife for her personal services and the rents and profits of her separate
estate"; La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2404 (West 1952) ; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 123.230 (Supp.
1959) ; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4619 (1960) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.16.030 (1961).
368. Arizona: The Arizona statute says simply: "During coverture, personal property may be disposed of by the husband only." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-211 (1956).
A "fraud" rule similar to that announced in the New Mexico Attorney General's opinion,
note 376 infra and accompanying text, has been invoked by the Arizona Supreme Court.
Gristy v. Hudgens, 23 Ariz. 339, 203 Pac. 569 (1922) ; California: The California statute
provides that the husband "can not make a gift of such community personal property,
or dispose of the same without valuable consideration . . . ." Cal. Civ. Code § 172;
Idaho: The Idaho statute provides no specific rule regarding the disposition of community personal property. Idaho Code Ann. § 32-912 (1948) ; Louisiana: The Louisiana
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Nevada36 9 and Washington,370 in that the husband has the "sole power of disposition of the personal property of the community, other than testamentary, as
he has of his separate estate .... ,,371 Although Washington has a similar statutory provision,3 72 the courts of that jurisdiction have interpreted the statute to
forbid a gift of community personal property without the consent of the wife. 73
This construction would not prevail in New Mexico, because of the legislative
history of the provision: In 1915 the New Mexico legislature repealed the requirement that no gift of personal property could be made by the husband 3 7 4 and
statute provides that the wife may bring an action against the heirs of the husband for
one-half the value of property disposed of by him in fraud of her interest. La. Civ. Code
Ann. art. 2404 (West 1952) ; Texas: Although the Texas statute gives the husband the
power of disposition (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4619 (1960)), I have difficulty in determining whether the Texas courts hold that a gift of the community property is a
fraud on the wife's interest and therefore void, which seems to be the rationale of
Allen v. Brewster, 172 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), rev'd on other grounds, 142
Tex. 127, 176 S.W.2d 311 (1943), or whether a gift of community property is valid
unless in fraud of the wife's rights (and this question, seemingly, is answered by relationships between husband and wife and between husband and donee), which appears
to be the finding in Shaw v. Shaw, 28 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), and Watson
v. Harris 130 S.W. 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910). In 1940 Professor Huie observed: "In
Texas the only clear rule that can be deduced from the cases is that.the husband has
some power to donate community property to third persons; the limitations upon that
power have not yet been determined by a decisive Supreme Court case." Huie, Community Property Laws as Applied to Life Insurance, 18 Texas L. Rev. 121, 126 (1940).
I believe that Allen v. Brewster, supra, decided three years after Professor Huie's article was published, may have muddied that clear rule just a bit; it is possible, of course,
to argue that the rationale of the intermediate appellate court was rejected by the
Texas Supreme Court's reversal, despite the fact that the community property problem
was not mentioned and the case was decided on an insurable interest theory, because
it appears from the supreme court's disposition of the case that the donee of the husband
was entitled to all of the proceeds of the policy which was purchased by the husband with
community funds. A federal court has suggested that if the gift of community property
is more than nominal and the wife objects it is a fraud on her interest in Texas. Kemp
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 205 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1953).
369. Nevada provides a special case. The history of the hasty changes made in the
Nevada statutes (which were almost a precise copy of present New Mexico statutes)
to protect against adverse federal tax determinations is recorded at notes 423-50 infra
and accompanying text. No change, however, was made by the Nevada legislature in
the rule which grants the husband the power to dispose of community personal property
during the marriage as if it were his separate property. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 123.230 (Supp.
1959).
370. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.16.030 (1961). See the discussion of the Washington
provisions in the text.
371. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-3 (1953). See note 366 supra.
372. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.16.030 (1961).
373. Hamlin v. Merlino, 44- Wash. 2d 851, 272 P.2d 125 (1954).
374. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 16 had placed the following limitation upon the husband's power of disposition of the community property: "he cannot make a gift of such
community property, or convey the same without a valuable consideration." This proviso was deleted by N.M. Laws 1915, ch. 84, § 1. In its stead was placed the proviso
that neither husband nor wife could convey community realty without the joinder of
the other spouse. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-3 (1953), at note 366 supra.
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enacted instead the present provision;375 it could not follow, therefore, that
the present provision disallows a gift of the community personal property made
by the husband. An attorney general's opinion delivered shortly after the statutory changes 6 advised that the husband could not dispose of the community
personal property in fraud of his wife's rights, and this rule has been accepted
by authorities on New Mexico community property law.377 The application of
such a rule, nevertheless, is entirely speculative; it certainly has had no observable practical consequence. The statutory provision378 affords no safeguards
or procedures by which the wife may protect her interest, and no reported
New Mexico case treats the issue of "fraud" on the wife's interest caused by
the husband's disposition of the community personal property. Granting the
theoretical existence of a rule which would protect the wife should the husband
give away community personal property with the obvious purpose of preventing
the wife's reaching the property at the dissolution of the community, 79 the
actual thrust of such a rule affords the wife little protection during the existence
of the marriage relationship. Viewed as a possible protection against the depletion of her interest which she would receive at the dissolution of the community,
the "fraud" rule, if such in fact exists, is not a protection of her community
interest.
The New Mexico statute does not name the husband as the manager of the
community realty, but merely states that "the husband and wife must join in
all deeds and mortgages affecting real estate .

.

. .""o This limitation on the

husband's power over the community real property is common to most of the
other community property states,8 8' and Professor Clark argues logically that
375. N.M. Laws 1915, ch. 84, § 1. In 1927 a further amendment was made which
permitted direct conveyances between husband and wife of community realty without
the joinder of each other in the conveyance. N.M. Laws 1927, ch. 84, § 1. See N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 57-4-3 (1953), at note 366 supra.
376. N.M. Ops. Att'y Gen., No. 2114 (1918).
377. Clark, Community of Property and the Family in New Mexico 25 (1956) and
Wood, The Community Property Law of New Mexico 82 (1954).
378. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-3 (1953). See note 366 supra.
379. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-7-6 (1953) gives a judge power to restrain disposition of
any property belonging to either party after a divorce complaint is filed. This is not a
community property rule. In Lohbeck v. Lohbeck, 308 P.2d 825, 826 (N.M. 1963),
where the husband transferred community personal property to a corporation of which
he was principal stockholder after the wife had filed a divorce complaint, the supreme
court, without mentioning any "fraud" rule, reversed an order holding the husband in
contempt, because he has "[d]uring coverture the sole power of disposition of the personal property . . . ." and, seemingly, the wife's sole remedy is § 22-7-6.
380. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-3 (1953). See note 366 supra.
381. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-452 (1956) ; Cal. Civ. Code § 172a; Idaho Code Ann.
§ 32-912 (1948) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.16.040 (1961). The Louisiana statutes forbid the conveyance of the community real property as a gift, unless it is to the children of
the marriage. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2404 (West 1952). In Nevada and Texas the
husband and wife musq join in the disposition of homestead property. Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 123.230 (Supp. 1959) and Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4618 (1960). The Texas courts
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the failure of the statute to name the husband as manager of the realty does
88 2
not deny him the power of decision concerning how the realty should be used.
In terms of the protection of the wife's interest, furthermore, the requirement
of joinder is only deceivingly protective. Community property held by the
spouses is not swelled, ordinarily, by the addition of real property; the usual
means of adding real property to the community is by a purchase with community
funds. If a husband wished to keep his complete power of disposition over the
community property, of course, he could refuse to expend community funds for
real property.38s
The two provisions enacted by the New Mexico legislature in 1901,84 upon
which the court in Beals v. Ares 385 based its conclusion that the wife's interest
in the community property was equal with that of the husband,186 are still part
of New Mexico statutory law.38 7 One provision allows a spouse who is permanently separated from the other spouse to institute suit for a division of property. 88 The other provides for a suit for a division of property when there was
a failure to do so at the divorce between the parties.8 89 The companion provision
to these two in the 1901 act,890 which declared that upon a division of the community property each spouse would take one-half, was repealed in 1907 ;,11 the
court in Beals v. Ares39 2 nevertheless interpreted the 1907 statutory structure
as though the provision had not been stricken a9 It would appear, therefore,
that the settled rule which requires an equal division of the community property
upon divorce89 4 would be applicable to the suit to divide the community property between permanently separated spouses. I would conclude that the community property relationship would be dissolved by such a division, 39 5 even
though the marriage relationship is not, but no New Mexico case has treated the
have held, however, that the husband may make a valid sale of the community homestead property for the excess over the homestead exemption, without the joinder of the

wife. Viersen v. Bucher, 342 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
382. Clark, op. cit. supra note 377, at 23.
383. And, of course, he has the "sole power of disposition of the personal property
of the community." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-3 (1953). See note 366 supra and accompanying text.
384. N.M. Laws 1901, ch. 62, § 23 and N.M. Laws 1901, ch. 62, § 31.
385. 25 N.M. 459, 185 Pac. 780 (1919).
386. See notes 76-84 supra and accompanying text.
387. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-7-2 and § 22-7-22 (1953).
388. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-7-2 (1953).
389. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-7-22 (1953).
390. N.M. Laws 1901, ch. 62, § 30.
391. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 34.
392. 25 N.M. 459, 185 Pac. 780 (1919).
393. See notes 79 and 80 supra and accompanying text.
394. Cauthen v. Cauthen, 53 N.M. 458, 210 P.2d 942 (1949); Sands v. Sands, 48
N.M. 458, 152 P.2d 399 (1944) ; Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 185 Pac. 780 (1919).
395. Note that I refer to the division of the community property and not to the permanent separation.
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precise problem 396 and my conclusion is not shared by the leading authority on
39 7
New Mexico community property law.
When the New Mexico community is dissolved by the death of the husband

one-half of the community property goes to the surviving wife, and if the husband does not dispose of the other half of the community property by will, that

other half also goes to the surviving wife.398 Although in one of the other
community property states significant limitations are placed on the decedent's
right of testamentary disposition of the community property,3 99 no restrictions
are placed on the husband's right by the New Mexico statute. 40 0 All of the other
396. The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that the permanent separation does
not dissolve the community of property. Loveridge v. Loveridge, 52 N.M. 353, 198 P.2d
444 (1948).
397. Professor Clark comments: "However, the statute [N.M. Stat. Ann § 22-7-2
(1953)] does not disturb the marriage relationship. Thus it would seem that the community of property continues .... ." Clark, op cit. cit. supra note 377, at 44.
398. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-9 (Supp. 1961). The statute now reads:
Upon the death of the husband, the entire community property goes to the

surviving wife, subject to the husband's power of testamentary disposition over
one-half of the community property. In the case of the dissolution of the community by the death of the husband the entire community property is subject to

the community debts, the husband's debts, funeral expenses of the husband, the
family allowance and the charge and expenses of administration.
This provision when originally enacted in 1907 gave one-half of the community property to the wife, and in the absence of testamentary disposition of the other half by the
husband it went "one fourth to the surviving wife and the remainder in equal shares
to the children of the decedent . . . ." N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 38, §27. In 1959 the 1907
statutory language was changed to the following:
Upon the death of the husband, the entire community property without administration, belongs to the surviving wife, subject to the husband's power of
testamentary disposition over one-half of the community property. There shall

be a conclusive presumption if no will is filed as provided by law within six
months after the date of the death of the decedent, that the decedent died
intestate. The entire community property is subject to the community debts,
the husband's debts, funeral expenses of the husband, the family allowance and
the charge and expenses of administration.
N.M. Laws 1959, ch. 147, § 1. The use of the word "belongs" can no doubt be attributed
to the magical spell which the word cast over the Tenth Circuit in Hernandez v. Becker,
54 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1931). See notes 294 and 295 supra and accompanying text.
The hope that the entire community property might escape estate taxation at the husband's death was obviously ill considered from the start. The anomalous statement that
the property belonged to the wife subject to the testamentary disposition of the
husband was, of course, pure nonsense. And how property which belonged "without administration" to the wife was to be subject to the husband's debts, etc. caused a baffling
problem. The 1961 amendment cured the provision of these nonsensical ills by eliminating the word "belongs" and substituting "goes," and deleting the "without administration" proviso. N.M. Laws 1961, ch. 12, § 1.
399. In Idaho the testamentary disposition of community property by the decedent
spouse may be made only in favor of the surviving spouse, the children, grandchildren
or the parents of either spouse (except for the unencumbered value in excess of $25,000).
Idaho Code Ann. § 14-113 (1948).
400. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-9 (Supp. 1961). See note 398 supra.
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community property states give the wife precisely the same power of testamentary
disposition over the community property as the husband possesses. 401 In New
Mexico, however, if the wife predeceases her husband, the "entire community
-402
property, without administration, belongs to the surviving husband ....
If it is the wife's death, therefore, which dissolves the community, two very
important factors are true: she has had no meaningful voice in the management
and control of the community property during her life, and she has no power
to dispose of any of the community property at her death. The dissolution of
the community by the husband's death, moreover, does not assure that the wife
will have ownership of any part of the community property, because the entire
community property at the death of the husband is subject, not only to the
community debts, but to his separate debts as well. 40 3 These separate debts of
the husband could consume the entire community property so that no property
would remain which would go to the wife at her husband's death.
New Mexico community property law places more in the husband's keeping
than the mere management of the community property. His virtually untrammeled power of disposition, the wife's meager check on his usage and control
of the property, the obvious superiority of the husband's position at the dissolution of the community by death-all these factors point to a conclusion that in
fact the husband's control amounts to ownership of the community property.
Even the New Mexico statutes demonstrate that under certain circumstances
the wife needs protection which cannot be afforded by the community property
system. When the wife is permanently separated from the husband, although
the community of property continues, 40 4 her earnings and accumulations are her
separate property. 40 5 During the existence of the community, in addition, the
wife's earnings (although community property 40 6 ) "are not liable for the debts
401. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-203 (1956) ; Cal. Prob. Code § 201; Idaho Code Ann.
§ 14-113 (1948) ; La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 915 (West 1952) ; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 123.250
(Supp. 1959) ; Tex. Prob. Code §45 (1956); and Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 11.04.050
(1963).
402. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-8 (1953). This provision has not been amended since
its passage in 1907. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 26. See note 49 supra and accompanying
text. The statute reads:
Upon the death of the wife, the entire community property, without administration, belongs to the surviving husband, except such portion thereof as may
have been set apart to her by a judicial decree, for her support and maintenance, which portion is subject to her testamentary disposition, and in the absence of such disposition, goes to her descendants, or heirs, exclusive of her
husband.
403. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-9 (Supp. 1961). See note 398 supra.
404. Loveridge v. Loveridge, 52 N.M. 353,198 P.2d 444 (1948). See note 396 supra.
405. "The earnings and accumulations of the wife and of her minor children living
with her or in her custody, while she is living separate from her husband, are the
separate property of the wife." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-3-7 (1953).
406. Albright v. Albright, 21 N.M. 606, 157 Pac. 662 (1916).
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of the husband, ' 40 7 but it is clear that the rest of the community property is
subject to such liability.408 Although it may be reasonable to ascribe the husband's managment powers to a necessity for a community agent, his powers
of disposition and the unequal treatment at death do not reflect managerial
status, but more closely resemble concomitants of ownership.
Analysis of the Label "Vested" Applied by the New Mexico Supreme Court to
the Wife's Interestin New Mexico Community Property
The devious path wandered by the Supreme Court of New Mexico in Beals
v. Ares 40 9 has been charted in Part I of this article. 410 In that case the court
referred to the wife's interest as "equal with that of the husband ' 411 and as
"an existing, present interest." 412 Although the court did not label the wife's
interest as "vested," the first New Mexico case which followed in which the
nature of the wife's interest was in issue inserted the label and attributed it
to Beals v. Ares. The court, in Baca v. Village of Belen, 418 announced that the
decision in Beals v. Ires had concluded that the wife "has a present, existing,
vested interest, equal in all respects to the interest of the husband. ' 414 In Baca
the court was forced to treat the stautory change, 41 5 enacted in 1915 and therefore not material to the problem in Beals v. Ares, 416 which removed the requirement that the husband receive consideration for a transfer of community
personal property and required the wife to join in transfers and mortgages of
real estate. 417 Would the court construe the grant of further powers to the
husband as changing the result in Beals v. Ares? Of course not, because the
court ignored completely the additional power of the husband over the community personal property, made a false statement about the statute which was
amended in 1915 and spoke only of the requirement of the wife's joinder in
real property transactions:
The change intended to be effected by the legislation doubtless was
that the husband should no longer, after the amendment, have the
absolute power of disposition of real property of the community. 418
407. "The earnings of the wife are not liable for the debts of the husband." N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 57-3-6 (1953).
408. See Brown v. Lockhart, 12 N.M. 10, 71 Pac. 1086 (1903); Strong v. Eakin,
11 N.M. 107, 66 Pac. 539 (1901) ; Clark, op. cit. supra note 377, at 29; Wood, op. cit.

supra note 377, at 86.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.

25 N.M. 459, 185 Pac. 780 (1919).
See notes 65-84 supra and accompanying text.
25 N.M. at 499, 185 Pac. at 793.
Id. at 492, 185 Pac. at 790.
30 N.M. 541, 240 Pac. 803 (1925).
Id. at 546, 240 Pac. at 805.
N.M. Laws 1915, ch. 84, § 1.
See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
The statute is now N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-3 (1953). See note 366 supra.
Baca v. Village of Belen, 30 N.M. 541, 546, 240 Pac. 803, 805 (1925).

MAY, 1963]

TAXATION

OF COMMUNITY

PROPERTY

The statute which was amended did not grant the husband "absolute power of
disposition" over the community property; the important proviso which the
court either ignored or failed to read was as follows: "Provided, however, That
he cannot make a gift of such community property, or convey the same without
a valuable consideration, unless the wife, in writing, consent thereto ....
No attempt was made by the court in Baca to analyze the nature of the wife's
interest; a reliance on the language of Beals v. Ares, with the insertion of the
word "vested," constituted the entire reasoning process of the court.4 20 This
blind reliance on precedent set the pattern for all of the New Mexico cases to
follow which termed the wife's interest as "vested." No subsequent case has
analyzed the relative powers of huband and wife over the community property;
each of the cases merely announces that Beals v. Ares established the rule that the
wife's interest is a present, vested interest. 421 No attempt has been made to sup419. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 16.
420. 30 N.M. at 546, 240 Pac. at 805.
421. The following quotations show the "progression" of the "vested" interest rule
in the New Mexico courts:
"In Baca v. Belen, supra, we defined the rights of a wife in the community property
during coverture as 'a present, existing, vested interest, equal in all respects to the interest of the husband,' following Beals v. Ares, supra." In re Chavez's Estate, 34 N.M. 258,
265, 280 Pac. 241, 243 (1929).
In the Beals Case we construed the statutes adopted from California . . .
and refused .to follow the construction of the California courts, which had held
that the community property and its increase belonged to the husband; that
the wife had a 'mere expectancy,' which did not amount to a present estate or
interest therein. . . . This court held that the wife's interest in community property was present, vested and equal to that of the husband; that the construction of the statute by the California courts, if followed, would render them
inconsistent with other New Mexico statutes.
McDonald v. Lambert, 43 N.M. 27, 32, 85 P.2d 78, 81-82 (1938).
To hold that a wife must survive the husband before she acquires any vested
rights in the community property is to hold contrary to the established law of
this state. It would make her interest in the community property, not a vested
interest equal with the husband's interest, but merely an inchoate right during
coverture somewhat analogous to a dower right. This theory we have rejected.
Her interest in the community property is an ever-present existing interest equal
to that of the husband. Beals v. Ares, supra; Baca v. Belen, supra; In re
Chavez's Estate, supra.
In re Miller's Estate, 44 N.M., 214, 218, 100 P.2d 908, 910-11 (1940).
"This court has held that the wife has a present, vested, one-half interest in the
community property, in every respect equal to that of the husband, Beals v. Ares . . .
Baca v. Village of Belen . .. In re Miller's Estate . .. ." Dillard v. New Mexico State
Tax Comm'n, 53 N.M. 12,17, 201 P.2d 345, 349 (1948).
"It seems to be conceded, and we so hold following a number of this court's decisions,
that the wife's interest in community property in New Mexico is vested in her. In re
Miller's Estate . . . Baca v. Belen . . . Dillard v. New Mexico State Tax Commission
...
Beals v. Ares . .. ." McDonald v. Senn, 53 N.M. 198, 204, 204 P.2d 990, 993 (1949).
"The holdings in Beals v. Ares . . . In re Chavez's Estate . . . and numerous other
decisions of this Court, including the cases of Dillard v. New Mexico State Tax Commission . . . and McDonald v. Senn . . . have settled the rule in New Mexico that the
wife's one-half interest in community property is vested in her and is equal to the interest of her husband." In re Stutzmann's Estate, 57 N.M. 710, 714, 262 P.2d 990, 992 (1953).
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port the rule, and the flimsy base upon which the court in Beals v. Ares rested
the broad, general and inaccurate conclusion that the wife's interest is equal to
that of the husband 42 2 remains the only support for the proposition which can
be found in any New Mexico case.
The Nevada Experience
When the income tax test cases 428 were decided, Nevada's statutory community property law 424 paralleled the New Mexico statutes in both content and

language. This should not be surprising, of course, because both sets of provisions were copied from the California statutes. 425 Under the Nevada statutes
the husband had full powers of disposition, 426 with a judicially imposed limita427
tion requiring that his disposition not be motivated by a fraudulent intent.
When the community was dissolved by the death of the wife the entire community property belonged, without administration, to the surviving husband, 428
but if the husband died first one-half of the community property went to the
surviving wife. 429 The Bureau of Internal Revenue, moreover, utilized the
sam! technique as they had for New Mexico, by finding a Nevada case 430 which
labelled the wife's interest as "vested" and bestowing tax consequences on the
basis of that label. 43 ' After Hernandez v. Becker 43 2 was decided, moreover, the
Bureau applied the rationale of that case to Nevada community property, by
holding that no inclusion of community property would be made in the wife's
433
gross estate if she predeceased her husband.
In 1955, however, the Internal Revenue Service finally awoke to the fact that
Nevada taxpayers were playing "heads we win, tails you lose" with the "vested
interest" label and the denial of the power of testamentary disposition to the
wife. The anomoly of treating the wife's interest as vested for income tax purposes and as a life estate for estate tax purposes jarred the Service into action.
Unwilling to change its notion that the state court label should be controlling,
the Internal Revenue Service again referred to the Nevada case 43 4 which labelled
the wife's interest as vested and issued a ruling which held as follows:
422. See notes 72-84 supra and accompanying text.
423. See notes 105-27 srupra and accompanying text.
424. See Nev. Comp. Laws 1929, §§ 3355-89.
425. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
426. Nev. Comp. Laws 1929, § 3360.
427. Nixon v. Brown, 46 Nev. 439, 214 Pac. 524 (1923).
428. Nev. Comp. Laws 1929, § 3364.
429. Nev. Comp. Laws 1929, § 3365.
430. In re Williams' Estate, 40 Nev. 241, 161 Pac. 741 (1916).
431. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
432. 54 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1931). See notes 256-95 supraand accompanying text.
433. Telegram, dated 9-30-48 from Bliss, Deputy Commissioner. P-H Est. & Gift
Taxes Par. 120,406.5 (Perm. Vol.).
434. In re Williams' Estate, 40 Nev. 241, 161 Pac. 741 (1916).
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In view of the decision of the Supreme Court of Nevada in the case of
In re Williams' Estate, holding that the interest of the wife in the
community property is not an interest in expectancy but is at all times
a vested interest, it is held that the value of one-half of the community
property and one-half of the jointly owned property acquired with
community funds is includible in the deceased wife's gross estate for
Federal estate tax purposes. 435
The consternation in Nevada caused by this ruling was real and understandable when the impact is considered: By taxing the wife's one-half at her death
the government was proposing that Nevada community property would be
subject to an estate tax on one and one-half times the value should the wife
predecease her husband. The inclusion of the full value of the community property at the later death of the husband, because the wife could not transfer her
one-half to some other person, 43 6 would subject the wife's one-half to another
estate tax. Note that this is precisely the disadvantage which plagued community property under the 1942 Revenue Act, 43 7 although in that case the trouble
occurred on the husband's prior death. Action by the Nevada legislature was
prompt. At the next legislative session after the issuance of the Revenue Ruling4 38 the legislature amended the community property provisions to allow the
489
wife testamentary disposition over her one-half of the community property.
This did not change the import of the Revenue Ruling; it would still require the
inclusion of one-half of the community property at the wife's death. The statutory change did allow, however, the wife to dispose of her one-half, so that it
would not be included again in her husband's gross estate. In this fashion, the
children of the spouses could receive the entire community property with the
440
least amount of tax erosion.

After the action by the legislature some further worries for Nevada taxpayers
were considered: Suppose the Internal Revenue Service were to look more
closely at the Nevada community property law, disregard the label applied by
In re Williams, 441 and decide the wife did not have a vested interest in Nevada
435. Rev. Rul. 55-605, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 382, 383.
436. Nev. Laws 1937, ch. 198, § 1. The Nevada law had been changed in 1935 to
allow the entire community property to belong, without administration to the surviving
spouse (husband or wife). Nev. Laws 1935, ch. 232, §1 . This rule was then changed
back again to the law as it existed when the test cases were decided in 1937. Nev. Laws
1937, ch. 198, § 1. But the 1937 act substituted the word "vests" for the world "belongs."
Nev. Laws 1937, ch. 198, §1.
437. See notes 311-15 supra and accompanying text.
438. Rev. Rul. 55-605, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 382. See note 435 supra and accompanying
text.
439. Nev. Laws 1957, ch. 264, § 1. The provision is now codified in Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 123.250 (Supp. 1959).
440. See notes 335-38 supraand accompanying text.
441. 40 Nev. 241, 161 Pac. 741 (1916). See note 64supra.
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community property? Exactly the same disadvantageous consequences were in
the offing as those caused by the 1955 Revenue Ruling: 442 If the Service made
such a determination the entire community property would be included in the
husband's gross estate if he predeceased his wife, and her one-half would be
subject to estate tax in her gross estate later. Thus, one and one-half times the
value of the community property would be subject to estate tax erosion before
it could be transferred to the children. Certainly the amendment 44 which allowed the wife to dispose of one-half of the community property by will would
supply a significant argument against this possible interpretation, but other provisions of the Nevada law 444 could be used to show the wife had less than one-half
ownership. In 1959 the Nevada legislature attempted to forestall an adverse
determination of this nature by enacting the statutory provision 445 which the
California legislature had passed in 1927 44 6-- the "interests of the husband and
wife . . . are present, existing and equal interests . . . . 44 To prevent the
construction given the California statute which caused a distinction between com448
munity property acquired before and that acquired after the 1927 enactment,
the Nevada legislature passed a specific provision making the testamentary disposition provisions passed in the prior legislative session 449 apply to community
45 0
property whenever it was acquired.
A Proposalfor Adequate Federal Tax Treatment of New Mexico Community
Property
Only administrative inertia and Hernandez v. Becker 45 1 shield New Mexico
taxpayers from the treatment outlined for Nevada taxpayers by the 1955 Revenue Ruling. 452 Reliance on the former is unjustified at times, as was demonstrated in Nevada, and reliance on Becker is misplaced. My disagreement with
442. See notes 4-35-37 supra and accompanying text.
443. Nev. Laws 1957, ch. 264, § 1.

444. The husband has "the entire management and control of the community property, with the like absolute power of disposition thereof ...as of his own separate
estate .... " Nev. Rev. Stat. § 123.230 (Supp. 1959). Further, the community property
over which the wife holds a power of disposition is subject to the husband's debts. Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 123.260 (Supp. 1959).

445. Nev. Laws 1959, ch. 298, § 1.
446. See note 133 supra and accompanying text.
447. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 123.225 (Supp. 1959).

448. See Hirsch v. United States, 62 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1932).
449. Nev. Laws 1957, ch. 264, § 1.
450. Nev. Laws 1959, ch. 298, § 2. This provision is codified into Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 123.250 (Supp. 1959). In addition the legislature made the provision defining the
interests of husband and wife applicable to community property whenever acquired.

Nev. Laws 1959, ch. 298, § 1. This statute is codified into Nev. Rev. Stat. § 123.225
(Supp. 1959).

451. 54 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1931). See notes 256-95 supra and accompanying text.
452. Rev. Rul. 55-605, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 382. See note 435 supra and accompanying
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the Tenth Circuit's rationale in Hernandez v. Becker is recorded in Part II of
this article ;453 changes made in the estate tax provisions after the passage of
the 1921 Revenue Act (which was controlling in Becker) 454 cast even further
doubt on its validity today. Under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code the provision including property owned by the decedent at death carries no qualifying
clauses; Section 2033 provides:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property
• . . to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time

of his death.

455

The 1921 Revenue Act added to the provision two qualifying phrases which
required that the property be subject to distribution as part of the decedent's
estate and be subject to the expenses of administration and charges against the
decedent's estate. 45 6 These phrases were deleted by the 1926 Revenue Act, 457
leaving only the necessity for the decedent to have an interest in the property at
the time of his death.
Section 2033 of the 1954 Code does not force the inclusion of the value of life
estates in the decedent's gross estate. 458 Underlying this determination is the
hypothesis that the decedent's death completely destroys the decedent's life-estate
interest in the property; therefore nothing can be said to pass at death from
the decedent to some other person, because the death extinguishes the interest. 459
Hernandez v. Becker might be rationalized on this hypothesis if the wife's interest in New Mexico community property were conceded to be a contingent
life interest. The corollary to this statement, of course, concedes the husband
ownership of the community property during the existence of the community;
at the wife's death he would receive no interest from her, because he has held
the proprietary interest all along. 460 If the wife is regarded as having a full,
existing vested interest in the community property, equal with that of the husband, however, at hr death an interest in the property must pass to the husband
453. See notes 292-95 .rupraand accompanying text.
454. See note 257 supra.
455. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2033.
456. See Section 402(a) of the 1921 Revenue Act which is quoted in note 257 supra.
457. Ch. 27, § 302(a), 44 Stat. 70.
458. Helvering v. Rhodes, 117 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1941), affirming 41 B.T.A. 62
(1940) ; Williams v. United States, 41 F.2d 895 (Ct. Cl. 1930) ; Frew v. Bowers, 12 F.2d
625 (2d Cir. 1926).
459. See Rev. Rul. 55-438, 1955-2 Cur. Bull. 601. The Estate Tax Regulations state
that Section 2033 is "concerned mainly with interests in property passing through the
decedent's probate estate." Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1 (a) (1) (1958).
460. The result of this corollary requires the inclusion of the entire community property in the husband's gross estate when he predeceases his wife. See Talcott v. United
States, 23 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 604 (1928). See notes 229 and
230 supra and accompanying text.

NATURAL

RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 3

in order for the entire community property to "belong" to him after her death.
His interest in the community property is enlarged because of the passing of the
wife's interest to him at her death. 461 The fact that the interest of the wife
passes to the husband by operation of law, rather than by testamentary disposition or inheritance, should be immaterial. 462 It is not the power of testamentary
disposition which is controlling in the application of Section 2033,463 but rather
whether an interest in property owned at the death of the decedent passes to some
other person. An acceptance of the vested interest theory of the wife's interest
in New Mexico community property requires an inclusion of one-half of the
community property in her gross estate when she predeceases her husband.
The move made by the Internal Revenue Service in Nevada, I submit, was
in the wrong direction. The wife's interest in New Mexico community property
does not amount to an ownership of one-half, and the same was true of the
Nevada wife's interest in community property before 1957.464 Two basic lines
of argument support this assertion: In all of the Supreme Court cases involving
the taxation of community property the only meaningful point of distinction
has been the power of the wife to dispose of the property at her death. 46 5 California wives prior to 1923 had no power of testamentary disposition over the community property, 46 6 and in the Robbins case 467 the Court held that they could
not be treated as owners of one-half of the property. An analysis of the testamentary powers of husband and wife was an integral part of the Court's opinion in
461. Professor Clark observes that Hernandez v. Becker "draws attention to the conin New Mexico law which holds that the wife has a 'vested' interest during

tradiction

life, but after her death the same law views her interest, for some purposes, as having
belonged to the husband all the time." Clark, Community of Property and the Family in

New Mexico 38 (1956).
462. Randolf Paul concludes his analysis of the Becker case as follows:
To what extent is the Becker case authoritative at the present time? . . .
Prior to the wife's death each spouse owns a one-half interest in the property.
After her death the husband is the sole owner of the entire property. If legal
title to community property is the touchstone of taxability, the interest of the
wife should be subject to estate tax where she predeceases her husband.
1 Paul, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation 215 (1942). Professor Clark observes tersely:
"Thus we may conclude that the Hernandez case deserves attention but hardly merits
veneration." Clark, ut. cit. supra note 461, at 41.
463. See quotation in text accompanying note 455 supra.
464. See the discussion of pre-1957 Nevada community property law at notes 424-29
supra and accompanying text.
465. And the consistency is maintained if a non-tax case, Arnett 'V.Reade, is included.
Arnett v. Reade, 220 U.S. 311 (1911). See the discussion of this point at notes 22-28 and
54-56 s.upra and accompanying text.
466. See Cal. Laws 1923, ch. 18, § I quoted in note 132 supra. See also notes 99-102
supra and accompanying text.
467. United States v. Robbins, 260 U.S. 315 (1926). See notes 88-104 supra and accompanying text.
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each of the test cases ;468 the Court carefully observed the equality of treatment
in this regard which was bestowed on husband and wife by the state law of each
of the four test states. 469 Upon dissolution of the community by the death of
either husband or wife in the four test states the decedent had testamentary disposition over one-half of the community property ;470 this was the single important thread which connected the fact patterns of the four test cases. An alternative
distinction which can be asserted, but hardly defended, would peg the Court's
decisions upon the label applied to the wife's interest by state court decisions. If
that is the level to which federal courts sink in deciding tax cases, of course, the
wife in New Mexico can be treated as owner of one-half, because the wife's
interest in New Mexico community property is vested and equal with that of
47 1
the husband-the New Mexico Supreme Court has said, "'Tis so."1
A second, and more persuasive, line of argument rests upon the fact that
New Mexico community property law does not sustain the assertions of the
state supreme court that the interest of the wife in the community property is
vested and equal with that of the husband. Her lack of control over her husband's powers of disposition,47 2 the ethereal nature of the elusive "fraud on the
wife's interest" rule, 473 and the complete disparity in the powers of husband and
wife at death over the community property 474-all these show a much greater
interest in the community property possessed by the husband. And that interest
is ownership, regardless of the label. Although the "equal with that of the husband" conclusion manufactured in Beals v. Ares 47 -5 has been accepted with no
sustaining reasons by a long line of New Mexico Supreme Court decisions, 476 a
reasoned federal court determination of the tax status of New Mexico community property must reach a different conclusion.
In light of the historical pattern of community property taxation and the
nature of the community interests under New Mexico law, I propose the following as an adequate tax pattern for New Mexico community property:
468. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118 (1930)
Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930) ; and Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1930). See
notes 105-27 supra and accompanying text.
469. See the pertinent language of the four decisions, quoted in note 122 supra.
470. "As in the case of other states, whose law we have discussed in connection with
this matter in the Poe, Goodell and Hopkins cases, supra, each spouse may by will dispose of only his or her one-half of the community and is powerless to affect the other's
half." Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127, 131 (1930).
471. The court, as a matter of fact, has said only "'tis so" in support of the rule. See
note 421 supra.
472. See notes 371-75 and 381-83 supra and accompanying text.
473. See notes 376-79 supra and accompanying text.
474. See notes 398-403 supra and accompanying text.
475. 25 N.M. 459, 185 Pac. 780 (1919). See note 65-84 and 409-22 supra and accom-

panying text.

476. See note 421 supra.
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A. When separate returns are filed by husband and wife community income
should be reported in full on the husband's return. The husband's complete control and substantial ownership makes the entire community income attributable
to him.
B. At the dissolution of the community by the death of the wife no community property should be included in her gross estate. Although this is precisely the
result of the holding in Hernandez v. Becker, the reason for my conclusion is at
odds with the rationale of that case and rests upon the same foundation as that
proposed by the district court judge 477 and counsel for Becker: 47 8 the wife's interest is insufficient to cause inclusion. She does not own one-half of the community property upon her death, because the community property which "belongs"
to the husband at her death has always been his.
C. It the dissolution of the community on the death of the husband all of the
community property should be included in his gross estate. He is the substantial
owner of all of the community property. At his death the wife gains a full onehalf ownership of the property which was formerly community, but she receives
this interest from her husband by operation of law.
CONCLUSION: PROPOSED NEW MEXICO STATUTORY REVISION

Three alternative tax treatments of New Mexico community property are
available to the Internal Revenue Service if the present state community property law is left undisturbed. None of the three affords New Mexico families tax
consequences as advantageous as those which may be planned for families in
all the other community property states.
Present Treatment

479

Present treatment accorded New Mexico community property income
results in optimum federal income tax advantages, because in those situations
when it is mandatory or desirable to file separate returns the community
income is divided between the spouses. 480 Federal estate tax consequences,
however, force tax erosion of family wealth which may be escaped in all the
other community property states. 481 The requirement that the progressive estate
tax rates be applied against the entire community property upon the husband's
death following the wife's 482 and the favorable income tax basis rule which is
unavailable for the community property when the wife predeceases her hus477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.

See
See
See
See
See
See

note 245 supra and accompanying text.
note 241 supra and accompanying text.
notes 160-69 and 316-65 supra and accompanying text.
notes 164-69 supra and accompanying text.
notes 335-43 supra and accompanying text.
notes 335-38 supra and accompanying text.
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band 483 cause severe drains upon the family wealth. These reasons alone should
prompt remedial action by the state legislature, but the possibility of one of the
other two alternatives being applied to New Mexico community property gives
even greater incentive to legislative action.
Nevada Treatment

48 4

If New Mexico forms the stage for the second act of the Internal Revenue
Service's performance which opened in Nevada, severe estate tax detriment
will befall New Mexico families. Although optimum income tax consequences
would continue, the family property will be taxed at the full estate tax rates
at the husband's death after his wife's and an estate tax will be assessed on
one-half of the community property at the wife's prior death. 48 5 New Mexico,
in that event, would be the only state in the country in which the family would
be forced to pay estate taxes on one and one-half the value of the family wealth.
The stepped-up basis rules would apply after the death of either the husband or
the wife, 48s but the price is not right.
48
My Proposed Treatment

7

Finally, if the treatment I have contended should be accorded New Mexico
community property is accepted by the Internal Revenue Service and the federal
courts the income tax advantages attending community property will be lost to
New Mexico spouses. 488 Precisely the same estate tax disadvantages which accrue under the present treatment 48 9 will attach to New Mexico community
property under my proposed agenda: If the wife dies first all the community
property will be included in the husband's gross estate when he dies, and it will
be taxed at the higher rates, because all the family property is lumped together
when the tax is applied. The basis advantage, 490 of course, is lost when the
wife predeceases her husband. If the husband predeceases his wife the marital
deduction will produce the same consequences as presently occur by the division
491
of the community property.
483. See notes 339-43 suspra and accompanying text.
484. See notes 423-50 supra and accompanying text.
485. See notes 436-37 supra and accompanying text.
486. The inclusion of one-half of the community property in the estate of the first
spouse to die (whether husband or wife) would meet the requirement of Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 1014(b) (6). See notes 339-42 supra and accompanying text.
487. See notes 464-78 supra and accompanying text.
488. The present community property advantages are discussed in text accompanying notes 164-69 supra.
489. See notes 335-43 supra and accompanying text.
490. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014(b) (6). See notes 339-42 supra and accompanying
text.
491. See notes 328-33 supra and accompanying text. Community property which is
treated as owned by the husband is not used to reduce the adjusted gross estate in
determining the limitation upon the marital deduction. For the purposes of reducing
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The ProposedStatute

In order to secure the optimum federal income and estate tax advantages
which are available to community property in all the other community property
states I propose the following statutory revision of New Mexico community
property law. The statute accomplishes two important changes: The wife is
given power of testamentary disposition over one-half of the community property 492 and significant control over the husband's disposition of community
property during the existence of the community.493 This will allow the family
to pass the community property to the children with the least amount of tax
erosion, and it will protect against the finding (which would be correct under
present New Mexico law 494 ) that the husband is the owner of community property. Finally, the proposed statute will permit adequate estate planning for New
Mexico families, because it removes what is at present a disrupting, unknown
factor in any New Mexico estate plan: who is going to die first, husband or
wife?
AN ACT
RELATING TO THE EQUALIZATION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY INTERESTS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE; AMENDING SECTION 57-4-3 NEW MEXICO STATUTES ANNOTATED, 1953
COMPILATION (BEING LAWS 1907, CHAPTER 37, SECTION 16,
AS AMENDED); REPEALING SECTIONS 29-1-8 AND 29-1-9 NEW
MEXICO STATUTES ANNOTATED, 1953 COMPILATION (BEING LAWS 1907, CHAPTER 37, SECTION 26 AND SECTION 27, AS
AMENDED); AND ADDING SECTIONS 57-4-1.1, 57-4-3.1 AND
29-1-9.1 NEW MEXICO STATUTES ANNOTATED, 1953
COMPILATION.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
NEW MEXICO:
Section 1. SHORT TITLE.This act may be cited as the "Community Property Equalization Act."
Section 2. A new Section 57-4-1.1 New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1953
Compilation is enacted to read:
the adjusted gross estate "community property . . . shall be considered as not 'held as
such community property' as of any moment of time, if, in case of the death of the decedent at such moment, such property (and not merely one-half thereof) would be or
would have been includible in determining the value of his gross estate . . . ." Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 2056(c) (2) (B).
492. See proposed statute, section 5 infra.

493. See proposed statute, section 3 infra.
494. See notes 464-78 supra and accompanying text.

MAY, 1963)

TAXATION

OF COMMUNITY

PROPERTY

167

"57-4-1.1. INTERESTS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE IN COMMUNITY PROPERTY.-A. The respective interests of husband and wife
in community property during continuance of the marriage relation are present,
existing, vested and equal interests, subject to the provisions of Sections 57-4-3
and 57-4-3.1 New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1953 Compilation.4 95
B. The provisions of this section apply to all community property whether
acquired prior or subsequent to the enactment of this section. ' 496
Section 3. Section 57-4-3 New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1953 Compilation (being Laws 1907, Chapter 37, Section 16, as amended) is amended to
read:
"57-4-3. POWER OF THE HUSBAND OVER COMMUNITY
PERSONAL PROPERTY.-A. The husband has the management and control of the personal property of the community, and during coverture the husband shall have the sole power of disposition of the personal property of the
community, other than testamentary, as he has of his separate estate [; but the
husband and wife must join in all deeds and mortgages affecting real estate;
Provided, that either husband or wife may convey or mortgage separate property
without the other joining in such conveyance or mortgage; and, Provided,
further, that any transfer or conveyance attempted to be made of the real property of the community by either husband or wife alone shall be void and of no
effect, except, that the husband may convey directly to the wife or the wife to the
husband without the other joining in the conveyance]. 497
B. Notwithstanding subsection A, the husband can not make a gift of community personal property or dispose of the same without a valuable considera498
tion without the written consent of the wife.
C. Notwithstanding subsection A, the husband can not sell, convey or encumber the furniture, furnishings or fittings of the home, or the clothing or
495. The wording (with the addition of the adjective "vested") is drawn from the
1927 California statute. Cal. Laws 1927, ch. 265, § 1. The wording is now codified in
Cal. Civ. Code § 161a. I do not propose that this provision accomplishes anything more
than summarizing the intent of the rest of the legislative enactment.
496. This would prevent an assertion that the legislature intends to create two kinds
of community property with different interests of the wife in each.
497. The deletion from N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-3 (1953) prepares the way for a
coverage of the real property rule in a separate section. See section 4 of the statute infra.
498. This subsection restores the rule enacted in 1907 (N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 16)
and deleted in 1915 (N.M. Laws 1915, ch. 84, §1 ). The rule reads the same as Cal. Civ.
Code § 172.
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wearing apparel of the wife or minor children which is community property
499
without the written consent of the wife."
Section 4. A new section 57-4-3.1 New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1953
Compilation is enacted to read:
"57-4-3.1. POWER OF THE HUSBAND OVER COMMUNITY
REAL PROPERTY.-A. The husband has the management and control of
the community real property, but the wife, either personally or by duly authorized agent, must join with him in executing any instrument by which such
community real property or any interest therein is leased for a longer period
5
than one year, or is sold, conveyed or encumbered. 00
B. Either husband or wife may lease, sell, convey or encumber separate prop50 1
erty without the other joining in such transaction.
C. Any transaction involving community real property enumerated in subsection A attempted to be made by either husband or wife alone shall be void and
of no effect, except that the husband may convey directly to the wife or the wife
50 2
to the husband without the other joining in the conveyance."
Section 5. A new section 29-1-9.1 New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1953
Compilation is enacted to read:
"29-1-9.1. DEATH OF HUSBAND OR WIFE-COMMUNITY
PROPERTY.-A. Upon the death of either husband or wife, one-half of the
community property belongs to the surviving spouse; the other half is subject
to the testamentary disposition of the decedent, and in the absence thereof goes
508
to the surviving spouse.
B. Community property passing from the control of the husband, either by
reason of his death or by virtue of testamentary disposition by the wife, is subject to community debts, the husband's debts and to administration and disposal
499. This protection of the wife's interest was also included in the 1907 enactment
(N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 16) and deleted in 1915 (N.M. Laws 1915, ch. 84, §1). The
rule reads the same as Cal. Civ. Code § 172.
500. Subsection A clarifies the status of the husband as manager of the community
real property. See Clark, Community of Property and the Family in New Mexcio 23
(1956). The provision is drawn from Cal. Civ. Code § 172a.
501. This is a proviso in present N.M. Stat. Ann § 57-4-3 (1953). See the deleted
language in section 3 of the proposed act jupra.
502. See the last proviso of present N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-3 (1953) in the deleted
language of section 3 of the proposed statute 5upra.
503. The language is drawn from Cal. Prob. Code § 201.
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under the provisions of Chapter 30, New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1953
50 4
Compilation.
C. In the event of testamentary disposition of community property by the
wife, the husband, pending administration, shall retain the same power to sell,
manage and deal with the community personal property as he had in her lifetime, and his possession and control of the community property shall not be
transferred to the personal representative of the wife except to the extent neces50 5
sary to carry her will into effect.

D. After 40 days from the death of the wife, the surviving husband shall
have full power to sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise deal with and dispose of
the community real property, unless a notice is recorded in the county in which
the property is situated to the effect that an interest in the property is claimed by
another under the wife's will. Such notice must also (1) describe the property
in which an interest is claimed, and (2) set forth the name or names of the
owner or owners of the record title to said property. There shall be endorsed on
such notice instructions that it shall be indexed by the recorder in the name or
names of such owner or owners of the record title to said property, as grantor or
grantors, and in the name of the person claiming an interest in said property,
508
as grantee.
E. The provisions of this section apply to all community property whether
50 7
acquired prior or subsequent to the enactment of this section."
Section 6. SEVERABILITY.
If any part or application of the Community Property Equalization Act is
held invalid, the remainder of the act or its applicability to other situations shall
not be affected.
Section 7. REPEALER.
The following acts are hereby repealed: Section 29-1-8 New Mexico Statutes
Annotated, 1953 Compilation (being Laws 1907, Chapter 37, Section 26) and
Section 29-1-9 New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1953 Compilation (being
Laws 1907, Chapter 37, Section 27, as amended). 508

504. This is provided in Cal. Prob. Code § 202.
50S.
The language is drawn from Cal. Prob. Code § 202.
506. See Cal. Prob. Code § 203.
507. See note 496 supra.
508. These two statutory provisions control the disposition of the community property at the death of the spouses under present New Mexico law.

